DNSSEC Validation Bypass via Out-of-Zone NSEC Next Field
The BIND resolver accepts validly-signed NSEC records where the "Next Domain Name" field points outside the signer's zone.
OpenShift Container Platform 4.22.11 bug fix and security update
Released 2026-08-25 · Red Hat rating Important · View on Red Hat →
The BIND resolver accepts validly-signed NSEC records where the "Next Domain Name" field points outside the signer's zone.
A DNSSEC validating resolver that is under a random subdomain attack against a DNSSEC-signed zone can suffer from runaway memory usage.
If a provably insecure domain is covered by both an NSEC and NSEC3 record at the parent, and there exist an RRSIG for only one of these types, then BIND may exit unexpectedly with an assertion while validating this proof…
It is possible for an attacker's zone to respond to a query with an RRSIG that has a smaller number of labels than the zone in which the RRSIG is contained.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: reject oversized nested action attrs Open vSwitch stores generated flow actions as nlattrs, whose nla_len field is u16.