RHSA-2026:95478

The BIND resolver accepts validly-signed NSEC records where the "Next Domain Name" field points outside the signer's zone.

Multiple flaws have been identified in `named` related to the handling of DNS messages whose CLASS is not Internet (`IN`) — for example, `CHAOS` or `HESIOD`, or DNS messages that specify meta-classes (`ANY` or `NONE`) in…

BIND servers that are configured to use TKEY-based authentication via GSS-API tokens are vulnerable to excessive memory consumption when receiving and processing maliciously-constructed packets.

If a BIND resolver sends a query for a DNSSEC-signed authoritative zone, and the authoritative server replies with a valid wildcard answer and signed NSEC3 proof, followed by an unsigned NSEC at the same owner name, it w…

If an attacker-controlled authoritative server can produce a negative answer that is exactly 65536 bytes, then a flaw in `named` results in a negative cache entry of 0 bytes.

On a resolver configured to use ``dns64``, if an applicable answer from the authoritative server is malformed in a specific way, the resolver `named` process will exit unexpectedly.

A DNSSEC validating resolver that is under a random subdomain attack against a DNSSEC-signed zone can suffer from runaway memory usage.

Replaying GSS-TSIG signed UDP messages can result in memory corruption in "`named`".

In a BIND resolver, inbound DNS protocol messages with a particular structure will result in additional processing, with no limit imposed by BIND.

If a provably insecure domain is covered by both an NSEC and NSEC3 record at the parent, and there exist an RRSIG for only one of these types, then BIND may exit unexpectedly with an assertion while validating this proof…

It is possible for an attacker's zone to respond to a query with an RRSIG that has a smaller number of labels than the zone in which the RRSIG is contained.

BIND may accept incorrect child-zone NSEC3 records as valid, which could allow an attacker to forge authenticated NXDOMAIN responses.