Acer

The FieldX MDM adb messaging topic passes unverified payloads directly into Runtime.exec(), allowing command/instruction injection.

The debugging routine SCREEN_CLICK(5053) enables a connection to skip the standard device login prompt entirely and directly enter an interactive shell interface.

The production build of the M3WebServer hard-codes its backend API keys, which can be easily intercepted through verbose error handling pages.

The /v1/Plan service relies entirely on a shared global API token for full administrative management, allowing arbitrary creation of zero-cost network access plans.

The registration path /v1/account/register provides no bot mitigation mechanisms, allowing malicious automated systems to flood the database.

Leftover engineering diagnostics and factory-level diagnostic software remain exposed on retail builds, giving malicious apps write privileges to internal NVRAM registers.

System log files output unencrypted SMTP server authentication passwords alongside sensitive employee corporate identification data.

Internal multimedia session archives are accessible without authentication, exacerbated by loose Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) rules that allow cross-site theft.

The account validation endpoint /v1/User/validate returns comprehensive user profile data sheets, which can be crawled by iterating predictable identification strings.

Overly permissive configuration settings on cloud storage containers expose active telemetry information publicly to the internet.

The system fails to evaluate instructional permissions over multiple internal operation codes (opcodes), permitting unauthorized application installations or command executions.

The hard-coded APK resource files never expire, and the shared scepter leads to information leaks and potential misuse.

Broadcast events allow malicious software to rewrite the device's default Mobile Device Management (MDM) endpoint address, shifting administrative ownership to an external attacker.

High-risk TrustAllCerts routines disable standard TLS certificate validation.

Incoming VPN network profile settings fail to process special characters safely, enabling command injection via malicious config files.

The ai_cmd utility executes with full root permissions.

The local MQTT broker does not enforce topic-level Access Control Lists (ACLs).

The system Binder boundary accepts unverified pass-through AT commands, giving local applications the power to read baseband files or disable cellular connectivity.

Unchecked public access permissions on a core Broadcast Receiver allow unauthorized local software components to invoke administrative operations.

Fixed AES-128-CBC keys inside the AcerConnect OTA application let attackers forge authorization credentials for arbitrary IMEI numbers.

The device encrypts data using AES-CBC with static zero-filled Initialization Vectors (IVs), making it susceptible to replay attacks and known-plaintext decryption.

Leftover debug modules contain fixed credentials for internal AWS Cognito test sandboxes, risking asset exploitation.

Crucial management API endpoints for cellular eSIM allocation do not validate caller authorization, allowing remote profiles to be rewritten or deleted.

The web administration panel binds broadly to the public IPv6 address space on port [::]:8080 without default firewall limits, making internal API endpoints reachable over the WAN.

Weak validation logic within device dissociation API routines allows a remote entity to forcefully unbind unrelated user endpoints, causing severe denial of service.