The VStarCam vstc.vscam.client library and vstc.vscam shared object, as used in the Eye4…
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- —
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- High · High · High
- Fix status
- No fix listed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.0 · NVD. Fix status from CNA.
Summary
The VStarCam vstc.vscam.client library and vstc.vscam shared object, as used in the Eye4 application (for Android, iOS, and Windows), do not prevent spoofing of the camera server. An attacker can create a fake camera server that listens for the client looking for a camera on the local network. When the camera responds to the client, it responds via the broadcast address, giving all information necessary to impersonate the camera. The attacker then floods the client with responses, causing the original camera to be denied service from the client, and thus causing the client to then communicate exclusively with the attacker's fake camera server. When connecting to the fake camera server, the client sends all details necessary to login to the camera (username and password).
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | all versions | — | No fix listed | CNA |
- — Vendor— Affected all versions Fixed in — No fix listed CNA
Remediation
No fixed version listed by the sources yet.
Timeline
- 2026-10-02 Threatist record created from CVE-2019-11014
- 2026-10-03 Alias added: GHSA-697w-v97c-p7qr
References
Sources
- CVE-2019-11014 · CVE Program
- CVE-2019-11014 · NVD
- FIRST EPSS
- GHSA-697w-v97c-p7qr · GitHub Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences