Command Injection in bestzip
Key facts
- Attack vector
- —
- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
- —
- Impact type
- Code execution
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- —
- Fix status
- Fixed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-77.
Summary
Versions of `bestzip` prior to 2.1.7 are vulnerable to Command Injection. The package fails to sanitize input rules and passes it directly to an `exec` call on the `zip` function . This may allow attackers to execute arbitrary code in the system as long as the values of `destination` is user-controlled. This only affects users with a native `zip` command available. The following examples demonstrate the issue from the CLI and also programatically: - `bestzip test.zip 'sourcefile; mkdir folder'` - `zip({ source: 'sourcefile', destination: './test.zip; mkdir folder' })`
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | bestzip (npm) | before 2.1.7 | 2.1.7 | Patch available | GHSA-4qqc-mp5f-ccv4 |
- bestzip (npm) Vendor— Affected before 2.1.7 Fixed in 2.1.7 Patch available GHSA-4qqc-mp5f-ccv4
Remediation
- Fix · GHSA-4qqc-mp5f-ccv4 bestzip (npm) Fixed in 2.1.7 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-10-03 Threatist record created from GHSA-4qqc-mp5f-ccv4
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences