accounts: Hash account number using Salt
Priority LOW 38Published · Updated
Key facts
- Attack vector
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- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
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- Impact type
- —
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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- Fix status
- Fixed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.
Summary
@alovak found that currently when we build hash of account number we do not "salt" it. Which makes it vulnerable to rainbow table attack. **What did you expect to see?** I expected salt (some random number from configuration) to be used in [hash.AccountNumber](https://github.com/moov-io/customers/blob/master/pkg/secrets/hash/account_number.go#L13) I would generate salt per tenant at least (maybe per organization).
Why it matters now
Fix Fixed github.com/moov-io/customers (Go): 0.5.0
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | github.com/moov-io/customers (Go) | before 0.5.0 | 0.5.0 | Patch available | GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 |
- github.com/moov-io/customers (Go) Vendor— Affected before 0.5.0 Fixed in 0.5.0 Patch available GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7
Remediation
- Fix · GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 github.com/moov-io/customers (Go) Fixed in 0.5.0 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-10-03 Threatist record created from GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences