Command Injection in Cocos Engine workflow
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- Code execution
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- High · High · High
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · NVD. Fix status from CNA. Impact type from CWE-77.
Summary
Cocos Engine is an open-source framework for building 2D & 3D real-time rendering and interactive content. In the github repo for Cocos Engine the `web-interface-check.yml` was subject to command injection. The `web-interface-check.yml` was triggered when a pull request was opened or updated and contained the user controllable field `(${{ github.head_ref }} – the name of the fork’s branch)`. This would allow an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner and run custom commands (potentially stealing secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN) and altering the repository. The workflow has since been removed for the repository. There are no actions required of users.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3
- Exploitation
- Poc
- Automatable
- No
- Technical impact
- Total
The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.
Affected products
Remediation
- Fix · CNA cocos-engine (cocos) Fixed in 6d06aefa26
Timeline
- 2026-10-02 Threatist record created from CVE-2023-26493
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences