Actions expression injection in `filter-test-configs` (`GHSL-2023-181`)
Key facts
- Attack vector
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- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
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- Impact type
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- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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- Fix status
- No fix listed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.
Summary
The `pytorch/pytorch` `filter-test-configs` workflow is vulnerable to an expression injection in Actions, allowing an attacker to potentially leak secrets and alter the repository using the workflow. ### Details The [`filter-test-configs`](https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/ec26947c586dd323d741da80008403664c533f65/.github/actions/filter-test-configs/action.yml) workflow is using the raw `github.event.workflow_run.head_branch` value inside the `filter` step: ```yaml - name: Select all requested test configurations shell: bash env: GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }} JOB_NAME: ${{ steps.get-job-name.outputs.job-name }} id: filter run: | ... python3 "${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/../../scripts/filter_test_configs.py" \ ... --branch "${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}" ``` In the event of a repository using `filter-test-configs` in a `pull_request_target`-triggered workflow, an attacker could use a malicious branch name to gain command execution in the step and potentially leak secrets. ```yml name: Example on: pull_request_target jobs: example: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - name: Filter uses: pytorch/pytorch/.github/actions/filter-test-configs@v2 ``` #### Impact This issue may lead to stealing workflow secrets. #### Remediation 1. Use an intermediate environment variable for potentially attacker-controlled values such as `github.event.workflow_run.head_branch`: ```yaml - name: Select all requested test configurations shell: bash env: GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }} JOB_NAME: ${{ steps.get-job-name.outputs.job-name }} HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} id: filter run: | ... python3 "${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/../../scripts/filter_test_configs.py" \ ... --branch "$HEAD_BRANCH" ``` #### Resources * [CodeQL for JavaScript - Expression injection in Actions](https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/javascript/js-actions-command-injection/) * [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/) * [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/.github/actions/filter-test-configs (GitHub Actions) | all versions | — | No fix listed | GHSA-hw6r-g8gj-2987 |
- https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/.github/actions/filter-test-configs (GitHub Actions) Vendor— Affected all versions Fixed in — No fix listed GHSA-hw6r-g8gj-2987
Remediation
No fixed version listed by the sources yet.
Timeline
- 2026-10-03 Threatist record created from GHSA-hw6r-g8gj-2987
References
Sources
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