tuf's Metadata API: Targets.get_delegated_role() is missing input validation
Key facts
- Attack vector
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- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
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- Impact type
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- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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- Fix status
- Fixed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.
Summary
The security of both a TUF client and repository implementations depend on the concept of trusted Metadata objects verifying the signatures over other Metadata that it delegates to. This verification process uses `Targets.get_delegated_role(delegated_role: str)` to find the delegation information. `tuf.api.metadata.Targets.get_delegated_role()` should ensure that the given `delegated_rolename` is actually a name of a role that is delegated by that Targets, but in the case of "succinct delegation" this does not happen. `tuf.ngclient` users are **not** impacted but direct users of `tuf.api.metadata` could be impacted. ### Impact If an attacker can make a Metadata API user run `Targets.get_delegated_role()` so that 1. the `Targets` uses succinct delegation 1. the `delegated_role` argument is not actually delegated by the `Targets` the result will be incorrect. This also means that if an attacker can make a Metadata API user run `Targets.verify_delegate()` or `Targets.get_verification_result()` so that 1. the delegating `Targets` uses a succinct delegation 1. the `delegated_role` argument is the name of some unrelated Metadata 1. that other Metadata is correctly signed by the keys defined in the succinct delegation the result would be a successful verification even though the `Targets` in question does not actually delegate to `delegated_role`. The impact is estimated to be low for following reasons: * This cannot impact a TUF client that implements the client workflow as specified since the delegated role name is not an input but is collected from the (trusted) delegating Targets itself * Actual signature verification is not bypassed: The verified metadata _must_ still be correctly signed by the keys specified in the delegating role. * The described situations are somewhat hypothetical: there does not seem to be any reason for a python-tuf user (whether client or a repository) to use `tuf.api.metadata` in this way. All users of `tuf.ngclient` are specifically **not** impacted. Users of `tuf.api.metadata` could be impacted if they use succinct delegations in a way described above. ### Patches A fix is available in python-tuf 3.1.1 as commit 77cb66bc and in later releases as commit eb4834d9._ ### Workarounds `tuf.api.metadata` users should only call `Targets.get_delegated_role()`, `Targets.verify_delegate()` or `Targets.get_verification_result()` with `delegated_role` argument that is known to be delegated by the `Targets` in question.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | tuf (PyPI) | 2.0.0 to before 3.1.1 | 3.1.1 | Patch available | GHSA-77hh-43cm-v8j6 |
- tuf (PyPI) Vendor— Affected 2.0.0 to before 3.1.1 Fixed in 3.1.1 Patch available GHSA-77hh-43cm-v8j6
Remediation
- Fix · GHSA-77hh-43cm-v8j6 tuf (PyPI) Fixed in 3.1.1 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-10-03 Threatist record created from GHSA-77hh-43cm-v8j6
References
Other 5
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-77hh-43cm-v8j6
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/commit/77cb66bc879d108c449ba4c46dfb0e3a9e57a785
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/commit/eb4834d9205d07ae164bc6c5b97787585c0acfdc
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/releases/tag/v3.1.1
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences