gluestack-ui Command Injection Vulnerability via discussion-to-slack GitHub Action Workflow
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- Code execution
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- High · High · None
- Fix status
- No fix listed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · CNA. Fix status from CNA. Impact type from CWE-77.
Summary
gluestack-ui is a library of copy-pasteable components & patterns crafted with Tailwind CSS (NativeWind). Prior to commit e6b4271, a command injection vulnerability was discovered in the discussion-to-slack.yml GitHub Actions workflow. Untrusted discussion fields (title, body, etc.) were directly interpolated into shell commands in a run: block. An attacker could craft a malicious GitHub Discussion title or body (e.g., $(curl ...)) to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Actions runner. This issue has been fixed in commit e6b4271 where the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow was removed. Users should remove the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow if using a fork or derivative of this repository.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3
- Exploitation
- None
- Automatable
- Yes
- Technical impact
- Total
The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.
Affected products
Remediation
No fixed version listed by the sources yet.
Timeline
- 2026-10-02 Threatist record created from CVE-2025-53104
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences