Exposure of GITHUB_TOKEN in Wazuh workflow run artifact
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- High
- Impact type
- Information disclosure
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- None · High · Low
- Fix status
- No fix listed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · GHSA-6xqr-4q5g-xc7x. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-522.
Summary
Wazuh's 4_testintegration_fim-tier-0-1-win.yml workflow uploads the current directory as a build artifact, which includes the .git/config file holding the run's GITHUB_TOKEN. A remote attacker with no privileges can download that artifact before the workflow ends, extract the token and use it against the GitHub API to change the repository. Affected versions run through v4.12.0.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
Description from the GitHub advisory
# Summary For each workflow run, Github generates an API key called the GITHUB_TOKEN. This is meant for the workflow to be able to authenticate to the Github API and perform duties outlined in the workflow file (checking out the repo, modifying PRs, etc). Github will automatically place this token in .git/config so that git-based operations use the key. If developers are unaware of this and somehow publish contents of their working directory, it's possible for the GITHUB_TOKEN to leak. It should only be valid for the duration of the workflow run, but there is some wiggle room that can be exploited by someone with enough determination. # Details The 4_testintegration_fim-tier-0-1-win.yml workflow file uses actions/upload-artifact@v4 to upload the build artifact. This artifact is a zip of the current directory, which includes the automatically generated .git/config file containing the run's GITHUB_TOKEN. Seeing as the artifact can be downloaded prior to the end of the workflow, there is a few seconds where an attacker can extract the token from the artifact and use it with the Github API to push malicious code or rewrite release commits in your repository. # Affected Workflow Run https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/actions/runs/15294671676/attempts/1 # PoC - Monitor for runs of the ci.yml workflow - Once a run is found, wait for the artifact to be made available - Download and extract the GITHUB_TOKEN from it - Use the token with the Github API to push a new commit to master with backdoored code. Alternatively update the release tags to point to this new commit so subsequent downloads of the releases contain the backdoor. # Impact Any downstream user of this repo. # Suggested Fix Only add the files required to the artifact, instead of specifying the current directory. Make sure the artifact doesn't contain environment variables or the .git/config file.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | Wazuh (actions) | v4.12.0 | — | No fix listed | GHSA-6xqr-4q5g-xc7x |
- Wazuh (actions) Vendor— Affected v4.12.0 Fixed in — No fix listed GHSA-6xqr-4q5g-xc7x
Remediation
The sources list no fixed version for Wazuh.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
Timeline
- 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-6xqr-4q5g-xc7x
References
Sources
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