miniOrange 2FA < 6.2.7 - 2FA Bypass via Password-Only Second-Factor Rebinding
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- Security bypass
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- None · None · High
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · CISA ADP. Fix status from CNA. Impact type from CWE-287.
Summary
The miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin before 6.2.7 does not bind the second factor being configured during the pre-login two-factor challenge to the target account's existing factor, allowing an attacker who knows a user's password to rebind that user's second factor to an attacker-controlled destination, complete the challenge, and take over the account, including administrator accounts.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3
- Exploitation
- Poc
- Automatable
- Yes
- Technical impact
- Partial
The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unknown | miniOrange 2FA | before 6.2.7 | 6.2.7 | Patch available | CNA |
- miniOrange 2FA VendorUnknown Affected before 6.2.7 Fixed in 6.2.7 Patch available CNA
Remediation
- Fix · CNA miniOrange 2FA (Unknown) Fixed in 6.2.7
Timeline
- 2026-10-02 Threatist record created from CVE-2026-16036
- 2026-10-03 Alias added: GHSA-2jhx-j965-53r6
References
Sources
- CVE-2026-16036 · CVE Program
- CVE-2026-16036 · NVD
- FIRST EPSS
- GHSA-2jhx-j965-53r6 · GitHub Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences