SQL injection in dvankooten koko-analytics

Summary

Koko Analytics is an open-source analytics plugin for WordPress. Versions prior to 2.1.3 are vulnerable to arbitrary SQL execution through unescaped analytics export/import and permissive admin SQL import. Unauthenticated visitors can submit arbitrary path (`pa`) and referrer (`r`) values to the public tracking endpoint in src/Resources/functions/collect.php, which stores those strings verbatim in the analytics tables. The admin export logic in src/Admin/Data_Export.php writes these stored values directly into SQL INSERT statements without escaping. A crafted path such as "),('999','x');DROP TABLE wp_users;-- breaks out of the value list. When an administrator later imports that export file, the import handler in src/Admin/Data_Import.php reads the uploaded SQL with file_get_contents, performs only a superficial header check, splits on semicolons, and executes each statement via $wpdb->query with no validation of table names or statement types. Additionally, any authenticated user with manage_koko_analytics can upload an arbitrary .sql file and have it executed in the same permissive way. Combined, attacker-controlled input flows from the tracking endpoint into exported SQL and through the import execution sink, or directly via malicious uploads, enabling arbitrary SQL execution. In a worst-case scenario, attackers can achieve arbitrary SQL execution on the WordPress database, allowing deletion of core tables (e.g., wp_users), insertion of backdoor administrator accounts, or other destructive/privilege-escalating actions. Version 2.1.3 patches the issue.