JS Recon: Command injection in PR Branch Checker workflow via untrusted pull request context values
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Impact type
- Code execution
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- High · High · None
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 4.0 · CNA. Fix status from CNA. Impact type from CWE-78.
Summary
JS Recon is a JavaScript enumeration and SAST tool. From 1.2.1-beta.1 until 1.3.1-beta.2, the PR Branch Checker workflow in .github/workflows/pr_checker.yml places github.head_ref and github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name into BRANCH_NAME and SOURCE_REPO and interpolates those untrusted values into a shell gh pr comment command. A remote user who opens a pull request can use shell metacharacters in a branch or fork name to execute commands in the GitHub Actions runner with the workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN, which has pull-requests write permission. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.1-beta.2.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3
- Exploitation
- None
- Automatable
- No
- Technical impact
- Total
The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.
Affected products
Remediation
- Fix · CNA js-recon (shriyanss) Fixed in 1.3.1-beta.2
Timeline
- 2026-10-02 Threatist record created from CVE-2026-55378
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences