pay-rails/pay: non-constant-time HMAC comparison in Paddle Billing webhook signature verifier
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- High
- Impact type
- Information disclosure
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- High · High · None
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · CNA. Fix status from CNA. Impact type from CWE-208.
Summary
Pay is a payments engine for Ruby on Rails 6.0 and higher. Prior to 11.6.2, Pay::Webhooks::PaddleBillingController#valid_signature? in app/controllers/pay/webhooks/paddle_billing_controller.rb compares the computed 64-character SHA-256 HMAC with the attacker-controlled h1 token from the Paddle-Signature header using Ruby String#==. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can repeatedly submit requests to /pay/webhooks/paddle_billing and obtain sufficiently precise timing measurements can infer matching digest prefixes and recover a valid signature. A forged accepted webhook is enqueued through Pay::Webhooks::ProcessJob and can cause a host application to update billing state, provision paid features, record refunds, or trigger customer notifications. This issue is fixed in version 11.6.2.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3
- Exploitation
- Poc
- Automatable
- No
- Technical impact
- Total
The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.
Affected products
Remediation
- Fix · CNA pay (pay-rails) Fixed in 11.6.2
Timeline
- 2026-10-02 Threatist record created from CVE-2026-70658
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences