RustDesk through 1.4.9 Heap Buffer Overflow via Unvalidated CLIPRDR FileContentsResponse Length

Summary

RustDesk's Windows clipboard redirection copies a peer-supplied length into a fixed-size caller buffer without an upper bound check. When an OLE paste consumer such as explorer.exe calls IStream::Read with a buffer of cb bytes, CliprdrStream_Read in libs/clipboard/src/windows/wf_cliprdr.c requests that many bytes of a remote file through cliprdr_send_request_filecontents and then executes CopyMemory(pv, clipboard->req_fdata, clipboard->req_fsize), where req_fsize is taken verbatim from the peer's CLIPRDR FileContentsResponse by wf_cliprdr_server_file_contents_response (req_fsize = fileContentsResponse->cbRequested) and is never clamped to cb anywhere in the chain. The function's only length comparison, req_fsize < cb, handles the short-read case and is evaluated after the copy has already occurred. A malicious or compromised peer that answers a small file-contents read with an oversized response therefore writes attacker-chosen data past the end of the paste consumer's heap buffer when the local user pastes clipboard file contents offered by the remote side. The file is a fork of FreeRDP's client/Windows/wf_cliprdr.c, where the same defect is CVE-2026-68579, fixed in FreeRDP 3.30.0.