Improper signature verification in IRONMACE Ironshield
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Local
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- Security bypass
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- Low · Low · None
- Fix status
- No fix listed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · CNA. Fix status from CNA. Impact type from CWE-347.
Summary
IRONMACE Ironshield 1.0.0.167 has a tvk.sys kernel-mode driver that authenticates client executables by checking for expected publisher and root-certificate strings in WIN_CERTIFICATE data ("IRONMACE Co., Ltd." and "DigiCert Trusted Root G4") instead of parsing and validating the PKCS signature data. As a result, a local unprivileged attacker may bypass this via crafted certificate data and obtain access to privileged IOCTL functionality.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3
- Exploitation
- None
- Automatable
- No
- Technical impact
- Partial
The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.
Affected products
Remediation
No fixed version listed by the sources yet.
Timeline
- 2026-10-02 Threatist record created from CVE-2026-97732
- 2026-10-03 Alias added: GHSA-xmqc-9f27-v5xv
References
Sources
- CVE-2026-97732 · CVE Program
- CVE-2026-97732 · NVD
- FIRST EPSS
- GHSA-xmqc-9f27-v5xv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences