OpenClaw's voice-call Twilio replay dedupe now bound to authenticated webhook identity

Summary

### Summary The voice-call Twilio webhook path accepted replay/dedupe identity from unsigned request metadata (`i-twilio-idempotency-token`), enabling replayed signed requests to bypass replay detection and manager dedupe by mutating only that header. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.25` (latest published npm version at triage time) - Fixed on `main`: commit `1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4` - Planned patched npm version: `2026.2.26` ### Impact Deployments using the optional `voice-call` Twilio webhook path could accept replayed webhook events as fresh events when an attacker had one valid signed request and changed only the unsigned idempotency header. ### Technical Details The fix removes unsigned-header trust from Twilio replay/dedupe identity and binds replay/manager dedupe to authenticated request material. It also threads a verified request identity through provider parsing so dedupe uses verification-derived identity rather than mutable headers. ### Fix Commit(s) - `1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4` ### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`). After the npm release is published, this advisory can be published without additional version-field edits. OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.