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TI-2026-66358 Aliases GHSA-725g-w329-g7qr

kora-lib: Token-2022 Transfer Fee Not Deducted During Payment Verification

Priority LOW 38Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
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Privileges required
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User interaction
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Attack complexity
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Impact type
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Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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Fix status
Fixed

No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.

Summary

## Summary When a user pays transaction fees using a Token-2022 token with a `TransferFeeConfig` extension, Kora's `verify_token_payment()` credits the full raw transfer `amount` as the payment value. However, the on-chain SPL Token-2022 program withholds a portion of that amount as a transfer fee, so the paymaster's destination account only receives `amount - transfer_fee`. This means the paymaster consistently credits more value than it actually receives, resulting in systematic financial loss. ## Severity **High** ## Affected Component - **File:** `crates/lib/src/token/token.rs` - **Function:** `verify_token_payment()` - **Lines:** 529–654 (specifically 633–639) ## Root Cause In `verify_token_payment()`, the `amount` extracted from the parsed SPL transfer instruction is the **pre-fee** amount (what the sender specifies in the `transfer_checked` instruction). The function passes this raw amount to `calculate_token_value_in_lamports()` to determine how many lamports the payment is worth. It never subtracts the Token-2022 transfer fee. The fee estimation path (`fee.rs:analyze_payment_instructions`) correctly accounts for transfer fees by calculating them and adding them to the total fee. But the verification path does not perform the inverse subtraction, creating an asymmetry. ## Vulnerable Code ```rust // crates/lib/src/token/token.rs:529-654 pub async fn verify_token_payment( transaction_resolved: &mut VersionedTransactionResolved, rpc_client: &RpcClient, required_lamports: u64, expected_destination_owner: &Pubkey, ) -> Result<bool, KoraError> { let config = get_config()?; let mut total_lamport_value = 0u64; // ... for instruction in transaction_resolved .get_or_parse_spl_instructions()? .get(&ParsedSPLInstructionType::SplTokenTransfer) .unwrap_or(&vec![]) { if let ParsedSPLInstructionData::SplTokenTransfer { source_address, destination_address, mint, amount, // <-- This is the PRE-FEE amount from the instruction is_2022, .. } = instruction { // ... destination validation ... // LINE 633-639: Uses raw *amount without deducting transfer fee let lamport_value = TokenUtil::calculate_token_value_in_lamports( *amount, // <-- BUG: Should be (amount - transfer_fee) &token_mint, config.validation.price_source.clone(), rpc_client, ) .await?; total_lamport_value = total_lamport_value .checked_add(lamport_value) .ok_or_else(|| { KoraError::ValidationError("Payment accumulation overflow".to_string()) })?; } } Ok(total_lamport_value >= required_lamports) } ``` For comparison, the transfer fee calculation exists elsewhere in the codebase and is used during fee estimation: ```rust // crates/lib/src/token/spl_token_2022.rs:165-198 pub fn calculate_transfer_fee( &self, amount: u64, current_epoch: u64, ) -> Result<Option<u64>, KoraError> { if let Some(fee_config) = self.get_transfer_fee() { let transfer_fee = if current_epoch >= u64::from(fee_config.newer_transfer_fee.epoch) { &fee_config.newer_transfer_fee } else { &fee_config.older_transfer_fee }; let basis_points = u16::from(transfer_fee.transfer_fee_basis_points); let maximum_fee = u64::from(transfer_fee.maximum_fee); let fee_amount = (amount as u128) .checked_mul(basis_points as u128) .and_then(|product| product.checked_div(10_000)) // ... Ok(Some(std::cmp::min(fee_amount, maximum_fee))) } else { Ok(None) } } ``` This function exists but is **never called** in `verify_token_payment()`. ## Proof of Concept ### Arithmetic Demonstration Given: - Token-2022 token with 5% transfer fee (500 basis points), whitelisted in `allowed_spl_paid_tokens` - Transaction fee cost: 5000 lamports equivalent - Token price: 1 token = 5 lamports **What should happen:** - User needs to pay 5000 lamports worth → 1000 tokens - Transfer fee on 1000 tokens at 5% = 50 tokens - Paymaster destination receives: 1000 - 50 = 950 tokens (worth 4750 lamports) - User should be required to pay MORE to cover the fee **What actually happens:** - User sends `transfer_checked` for `amount = 1000` tokens - `verify_token_payment()` calculates: 1000 tokens * 5 lamports/token = 5000 lamports - 5000 >= 5000 required → **payment verified as sufficient** - But paymaster only received 950 tokens (worth 4750 lamports) - **Paymaster lost 250 lamports on this transaction** **Over 1000 transactions:** Paymaster loses 250,000 lamports (0.25 SOL) ### Runnable Test (using existing test infrastructure) ```rust #[tokio::test] async fn test_token2022_transfer_fee_not_deducted_in_verification() { // Setup: Token-2022 mint with 10% transfer fee (1000 bps) let transfer_fee_config = create_transfer_fee_config( 1000, // 10% basis points u64::MAX, // no maximum fee cap ); let mint_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique(); let mint_account = MintAccountMockBuilder::new() .with_decimals(6) .with_supply(1_000_000_000_000) .with_extension(ExtensionType::TransferFeeConfig) .build_token2022(); // User sends transfer_checked for 1,000,000 tokens (1 token at 6 decimals) let transfer_amount: u64 = 1_000_000; // What verify_token_payment credits: let credited_amount = transfer_amount; // = 1,000,000 // What the paymaster actually receives (after 10% on-chain fee): let actual_received = transfer_amount - (transfer_amount * 1000 / 10000); // = 900,000 // BUG: credited_amount (1,000,000) > actual_received (900,000) // Paymaster is credited 11.1% MORE than it actually receives assert!(credited_amount > actual_received); assert_eq!(credited_amount - actual_received, 100_000); // 100,000 token units lost // The financial loss per transaction = 10% of the payment amount // This is NOT a rounding error — it is a full percentage-based loss } ``` ## Impact - **Systematic Financial Loss:** The paymaster consistently credits more token value than it receives for every transaction paid with a transfer-fee-bearing Token-2022 token. - **Loss Scale:** Proportional to `transfer_fee_basis_points / 10000 * payment_amount` per transaction. For a token with 5% fee and 100 transactions/day at $1 each, that is $5/day or $1,825/year in losses. - **Precondition:** Requires a Token-2022 token with `TransferFeeConfig` extension to be whitelisted in `allowed_spl_paid_tokens`. The existing test infrastructure already creates such tokens (`TestAccountSetup::create_usdc_mint_2022()` with 100 bps / 1% fee). ## Recommendation Deduct the Token-2022 transfer fee before calculating the lamport value of the payment: ```rust // In verify_token_payment(), after extracting amount: let effective_amount = if *is_2022 { // Fetch the mint to check for TransferFeeConfig let mint_account = CacheUtil::get_account( rpc_client, &token_mint, false, ).await?; let mint_info = Token2022MintInfo::from_account_data(&mint_account.data)?; if let Ok(Some(fee)) = mint_info.calculate_transfer_fee( *amount, rpc_client.get_epoch_info().await?.epoch, ) { amount.saturating_sub(fee) } else { *amount } } else { *amount }; let lamport_value = TokenUtil::calculate_token_value_in_lamports( effective_amount, // Use post-fee amount &token_mint, config.validation.price_source.clone(), rpc_client, ) .await?; ``` ## References - `crates/lib/src/token/token.rs:529-654` — `verify_token_payment()` using raw amount - `crates/lib/src/token/spl_token_2022.rs:165-198` — `calculate_transfer_fee()` (exists but not called in verification) - `crates/lib/src/fee/fee.rs:174-204` — `analyze_payment_instructions()` (correctly accounts for transfer fee in estimation) - SPL Token-2022 specification: transfer fees are deducted from the transfer amount by the on-chain program

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed kora-lib (crates.io): 2.0.5

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—kora-lib (crates.io)before 2.0.52.0.5Patch availableGHSA-725g-w329-g7qr
  • kora-lib (crates.io) Vendor— Affected before 2.0.5 Fixed in 2.0.5 Patch available GHSA-725g-w329-g7qr

Remediation

  • Fix · GHSA-725g-w329-g7qr kora-lib (crates.io) Fixed in 2.0.5 Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-10-03 Threatist record created from GHSA-725g-w329-g7qr

References

Sources

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