OpenClaw: Gateway `agent` calls could override the workspace boundary
Key facts
- Attack vector
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- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
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- Impact type
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- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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- Fix status
- Fixed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.
Summary
### Summary The public gateway `agent` RPC allowed an authenticated operator with `operator.write` to supply attacker-controlled `spawnedBy` and `workspaceDir` values. That let the caller re-root the agent run outside its configured workspace boundary. ### Impact A non-owner operator could escape the intended workspace boundary and run normal file and exec tools from an arbitrary process-accessible directory. ### Affected versions `openclaw` `<= 2026.3.8` ### Patch Fixed in `openclaw` `2026.3.11` and included in later releases such as `2026.3.12`. The gateway now enforces the configured workspace boundary for agent runs regardless of caller-supplied overrides.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | openclaw (npm) | before 2026.3.11 | 2026.3.11 | Patch available | GHSA-2rqg-gjgv-84jm |
- openclaw (npm) Vendor— Affected before 2026.3.11 Fixed in 2026.3.11 Patch available GHSA-2rqg-gjgv-84jm
Remediation
- Fix · GHSA-2rqg-gjgv-84jm openclaw (npm) Fixed in 2026.3.11 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-10-03 Threatist record created from GHSA-2rqg-gjgv-84jm
References
Sources
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