Hugo: security.http.urls deny rules bypassed by alternate IPv4 encodings (SSRF)

Summary

### Impact The default `security.http.urls` policy denies requests to loopback, internal, and cloud-metadata IPv4 literals (e.g. `http://127.0.0.1/`, `http://169.254.169.254/`). The deny rule only matched dotted-decimal notation, so alternate IPv4 encodings of the same addresses — integer, hex, or octal, which contain no dot — passed the policy: - `http://2130706433/` → `127.0.0.1` - `http://2852039166/` → `169.254.169.254` (cloud metadata) - `http://0x7f000001/`, `http://017700000001/`, `http://0/` When a template passes an untrusted or data-derived URL to `resources.GetRemote` and the host platform uses the cgo system resolver, these encodings resolve to the blocked address — allowing build-time server-side requests to loopback and internal services, including the cloud-metadata endpoint in hosted/CI builds. The same check is reused on redirects, so the gap also applies to each redirect hop. This affects sites that rely on `security.http.urls` as a security boundary while fetching attacker-influenced remote URLs; it does not affect sites that fully trust the URLs they fetch. ### Patches Fixed in **v0.163.1**. Integer/hex/octal IPv4 hosts are now canonicalized to dotted-decimal before the policy is applied, so every encoding of an address is treated alike. No configuration change is required. ### Workarounds Avoid passing untrusted URLs to `resources.GetRemote`, or tighten `security.http.urls` to an explicit allow-list of trusted hosts. ### Affected versions v0.162.0 – v0.163.0 (patched in v0.163.1).