n8n: Git Node fetch/pull/pushTags Operations Bypass Sandbox Path Restriction

Summary

## Impact Authenticated n8n users with workflow create/execute rights could use the Git node's fetch, pull, or push-tags operations to bypass the repository-path containment checks that already protected clone and push. By pointing an allowlisted remote configuration value at a local path outside the intended sandbox, an attacker could pull an arbitrary local git repository into the workspace and subsequently read its files and history. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.67, 2.31.5, and 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. - Disable the Git node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.git` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.