Trojanized pantheon-agents 0.6.1 and 0.6.2 on PyPI ship a credential stealer (supply-chain account compromise)

Summary

## Summary The PyPI account that publishes `pantheon-agents` was compromised in the June 2026 "Hades" PyPI supply-chain attack (Mini Shai-Hulud / Miasma lineage). The attacker used a stolen, long-lived PyPI API token to upload **trojanized releases `pantheon-agents` 0.6.1 and 0.6.2 directly to PyPI**. **Only the PyPI artifacts are affected.** The GitHub source repository, its git tags, and all other distribution channels are clean — no malicious code was committed to the repository. ## Affected - `pantheon-agents` **0.6.1** and **0.6.2** on PyPI. Not affected: installs from the GitHub source, version 0.6.0 and earlier, and the Desktop / Online apps. ## Indicators of compromise The malicious wheels ship a `*-setup.pth` file that executes on Python startup. It downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime and runs an obfuscated credential stealer (`_index.js`) that harvests and exfiltrates credentials reachable from the host — environment variables, `~/.pypirc`, `~/.npmrc`, cloud credentials (`~/.aws`, etc.), SSH keys, and API tokens. Check your environment's `site-packages` for an unexpected `*-setup.pth`, and your home directory for `_index.js` or a Bun runtime (`~/.bun`). ## Impact Anyone who `pip install`ed `pantheon-agents` 0.6.1 or 0.6.2 should assume **every credential present on that machine has been exfiltrated.** ## Remediation 1. **Do not install `pantheon-agents` from PyPI** until distribution resumes. 2. If you installed 0.6.1 or 0.6.2: - Run `pip uninstall pantheon-agents` immediately and check for the IoCs above. - **Rotate every credential** that was present on that machine (API keys, tokens, SSH keys, cloud credentials). 3. Install only from the clean GitHub source: ``` pip install "git+https://github.com/aristoteleo/PantheonOS.git" ``` ## Status The PyPI account is suspended and the malicious token has been disabled. PyPI distribution will resume after account recovery and migration to PyPI Trusted Publishing (OIDC). Sibling projects by the same maintainer (e.g. executor-engine, funcdesc, cmd2func, pantheon-toolsets, coolbox, ufish, magique, executor-http) were hit by the same campaign and are being remediated separately.