Read the docs
TI-2026-67268 Aliases GHSA-73p9-6hrp-8qhr

AIIR verification and policy gates could report success without enforcing the control (fail-open)

Priority LOW 38CWE-347Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
—
Privileges required
—
User interaction
—
Attack complexity
—
Impact type
Security bypass
Confidentiality · integrity · availability
—
Fix status
Fixed

No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-347.

Summary

### Summary Several of AIIR's verification and policy paths could return a success/"verified" result without actually enforcing the control they represent — they could **fail open** rather than fail closed. For a tool whose purpose is trustworthy verification, a consumer relying on these gates may have treated unverified or non-conforming input as verified. Found during an internal adversarial hardening review of AIIR (not a third-party audit). All paths are fixed in **1.7.0**. ### Affected paths - A `require_signing` policy gate could be satisfied by a forgeable/empty field, so an unsigned or forged-bundle receipt could pass a "signing required" check without a valid signature. - A CI verification path could report `success` regardless of the underlying verification result. - A release-verification gate could advertise policy limits it did not actually enforce. - A signature-verification path could be silently skipped for certain input categories, exiting success without verifying. ### Impact A consumer relying on these gates (e.g. `require_signing`, release/policy verification, or the CI check) to block unsigned, forged, or non-conforming receipts could have received a false "verified"/"pass". Exploitation requires reliance on the affected gate; it does not forge valid signatures, nor does it compromise content-addressing or correctly-signed receipts. ### Patches Fixed in **1.7.0**. Every affected path now fails closed, each with a regression test. Upgrade to `aiir >= 1.7.0`. ### Workarounds None for earlier versions other than upgrading. Full cryptographic Sigstore verification (`pip install aiir[sign]`, `--verify-signature` with `--signer-identity`/`--signer-issuer`) provides defense in depth. ### Scope note This advisory covers code present in released versions (`< 1.7.0`). Separately, an unreleased agent-receipt feature had pre-release forgery findings fixed before it shipped — those were never in a released version and are out of scope.

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed aiir (PyPI): 1.7.0

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—aiir (PyPI)before 1.7.01.7.0Patch availableGHSA-73p9-6hrp-8qhr
  • aiir (PyPI) Vendor— Affected before 1.7.0 Fixed in 1.7.0 Patch available GHSA-73p9-6hrp-8qhr

Remediation

  • Fix · GHSA-73p9-6hrp-8qhr aiir (PyPI) Fixed in 1.7.0 Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-10-03 Threatist record created from GHSA-73p9-6hrp-8qhr

References

Sources

This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences