HTML injection in odf-kit ODS renderer enables cross-site scripting

### Summary ODF style values are interpolated into `style="..."` attributes without HTML-escaping in odf-kit's ODS to-HTML renderer (`odsToHtml()`). A double-quote character inside an attacker-controlled style value breaks out of the attribute, allowing arbitrary HTML/attribute injection — and therefore script execution (XSS) — from a crafted `.ods` file wherever the rendered output is inserted as HTML, which is the documented purpose of the function. ### Details Two emission sites in `src/ods/to-html/html-renderer.ts` (before 0.14.0, `src/ods-reader/html-renderer.ts`) write document-controlled values into a `style` attribute without escaping: - **Cell style.** `buildInlineStyle()` assembles a CSS string from the cell's formatting properties (`fo:color`, `fo:font-size`, `fo:font-family`, `fo:background-color`, `fo:text-align`, etc.) with no escaping, and `renderCell` emits it raw as the cell's `style` attribute. - **Row height.** `row.height` (from `style:row-height`) is emitted raw into the row element's `style` attribute. The same defect in the ODT renderer (`odtToHtml()`) is tracked as GHSA-3cgg-c5pp-57h6 (CVE-2026-113787). ### Impact Any consumer that renders `odsToHtml()` output as HTML gets XSS from a crafted `.ods` file they convert: untrusted file → arbitrary tags and attributes → script execution in the host page with the page's origin. ### Patches Fixed in 0.14.2. Both sites now route document-controlled values through a shared attribute-escaping helper: - [`1424227`](https://github.com/GitHubNewbie0/odf-kit/commit/1424227d1ca2716a249b623d1456575ff0331dcc): escape style attribute values in the ODS HTML renderer - [`aa64c73`](https://github.com/GitHubNewbie0/odf-kit/commit/aa64c734ebd7e7be40e35fcda83b1144193c3da2): the shared `escapeAttr` helper Users should upgrade to 0.14.2 or later. ### Credit Reported by @PethuKannan.