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TI-2026-83437 Aliases CVE-2026-63378

Python code execution in TAKO AI Agent for Okta via validator bypass

Priority MEDIUM 40CWE-94Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
Network
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low
Impact type
Code execution
Confidentiality · integrity · availability
High · High · High
Fix status
Fixed

Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · CNA. Fix status from CNA. Impact type from CWE-94.

Summary

TAKO AI Agent for Okta before 3.0.1-beta lets any authenticated user submit Python code without administrator privilege. A flaw in code validation (CWE-94) lets the submitted code evade the checks and run as the application process user, which is root in the default container. An attacker with a valid session cookie can read environment secrets such as Okta API tokens and the JWT key, access the SQLite database, and pivot to backend services.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-05

Description from the CNA

TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, any authenticated user with a valid `fctr_session` cookie can submit arbitrary Python source in the `script_code` field of `POST /api/react/execute-script`, without administrator privilege. In `src/api/routers/react_stream.py`, the source is stored with `skip_discovery=True`, bypassing AI-based content filtering, and is passed to `validate_generated_code` in `src/utils/security_config.py`. `BLOCKED_PATTERNS` recognizes direct `__import__` calls but misses the import name passed as a string, `getattr` is in `ALLOWED_BUILTINS`, and the AST checker handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` targets but fails to handle `ast.Call` targets. Dynamic `getattr` call chains through `__builtins__` therefore evade validation. The `_write_temp_script` helper writes the accepted code to disk, and `asyncio.create_subprocess_exec()` executes it as the application process user, which is root in the default container. Command output is returned as Server-Sent Events through `GET /api/react/stream-react-updates?process_id=<id>`. The resulting container compromise can disclose environment secrets including Okta API tokens and the JWT key, expose the SQLite database, and permit backend-service pivoting and persistence. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.

Why it matters now

Exploitation None reported CISA SSVC · not in CISA KEV
EPSS 0.00361 30th percentileScored 2026-11-07
Fix Fixed okta-ai-agent (fctr-id): 3.0.1-beta

SSVC decision points

CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3

Exploitation
None
Automatable
No
Technical impact
Total

The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
fctr-idokta-ai-agentbefore 3.0.1-beta3.0.1-betaPatch availableCNA
  • okta-ai-agent Vendorfctr-id Affected before 3.0.1-beta Fixed in 3.0.1-beta Patch available CNA

Remediation

Upgrade the fctr-id okta-ai-agent product to version 3.0.1-beta, which fixes this issue.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-05

  • Fix · CNA okta-ai-agent (fctr-id) Fixed in 3.0.1-beta

Timeline

  1. 2026-10-30 Threatist record created from CVE-2026-63378
  2. 2026-11-01 Priority changed: MEDIUM → LOW
  3. 2026-11-02 CISA SSVC decision points changed
  4. 2026-11-02 Priority changed: LOW → MEDIUM

References

  • TI-2026-83436 Missing authentication in TAKO AI Agent for Okta lets attackers take over admin CVSS 3.1CRITICAL 9.8

Sources

This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences