Sandbox isolation failure in Yuxi exposes cross-tenant data and services

Yuxi is a large-model-based intelligent knowledge base and knowledge graph agent development platform. From 0.6.0.beta1 until 0.7.1, there is insufficient isolation between execution-capable Docker sandboxes and trusted application services. A low-privileged authenticated user who can execute commands in their own sandbox can reach other tenants' sandbox APIs, access their files and secrets, execute commands in active sandboxes, and enumerate, create, or delete sandboxes through the unauthenticated provisioner without knowing administrator, database, or MinIO credentials. Sandboxes can also reach shared internal services; if shipped default service credentials remain unchanged, an attacker can use them, and if the exposed PostgreSQL account is a superuser, obtain command execution in the PostgreSQL container. These paths can disclose or modify cross-tenant data and sandbox state or cause denial of service through sandbox deletion without a container escape or kernel vulnerability. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.1. Existing deployments must separately rotate persisted PostgreSQL, Neo4j, or MinIO credentials that were previously set to documented or shipped defaults because upgrading the Compose files does not automatically rotate them.