Decompression bomb in ezstd lets attackers exhaust BEAM memory

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in silviucpp ezstd allows an attacker who supplies a zstd frame to ezstd:decompress_using_ddict/2 to exhaust memory and terminate the Erlang VM via a small frame that declares a very large content size. zstd_nif_decompress_using_ddict in c_src/ezstd_nif.cc reads the frame's declared content size with ZSTD_getFrameContentSize and passes it directly to enif_make_new_binary, without the 1 GiB MAX_BUFFER_SIZE check that ezstd:decompress/1 applies before allocating. A valid 65,550-byte frame of RLE blocks declaring 2 GiB is rejected by ezstd:decompress/1 but is fully allocated and decompressed by the dictionary path. The allocation happens inside a NIF, so when it exceeds the memory available to the VM the operating system kills the whole node rather than the calling process. This issue affects ezstd: from 1.0.5 before 1.2.5.