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Unbounded decompression in the whatstk ZIP loader exhausts memory and disk

Priority LOW 29CWE-409Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
Local
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Active
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Impact type
—
Confidentiality · integrity · availability
None · None · High
Fix status
Fixed

Attack profile from CVSS 4.0 · CNA. Fix status from CNA.

Summary

The whatstk Python package, from 0.7.0 before 0.9.0, unsafely extracts ZIP chat exports, so a party that supplies a chat export can exhaust the memory and disk of the process that parses it (CWE-409). The ZIP loader calls extractall() with no bound on member size or compression ratio, and its file-count check runs only after the files are written. An attacker needs to supply only a small, highly compressed ZIP file, which costs hundreds of megabytes of memory and disk and can get the parsing process killed.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-11

Description from the CNA

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (CWE-409) in the ZIP loader of whatstk from 0.7.0 before 0.9.0 allows a party that supplies a chat export to exhaust the memory and the disk of the process that parses it, because _str_from_file() (whatstk/whatsapp/parser.py) calls zip_ref.extractall() with no bound on the size of the members and no check of the compression ratio, then reads the extracted file in full with f.read(). The only guard on the archive counts the extracted files and raises when there is not exactly one, but it runs after extractall() has already written them, so it does not prevent the cost. _clean_text() then passes the whole text through unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", text), which holds a second copy, and the parse builds a list of regular expression matches and a DataFrame over it, so peak memory is a multiple of the decompressed text rather than of the archive. A ZIP is a documented input of WhatsAppChat.from_source() and df_from_whatsapp(), and is the form in which WhatsApp exports a chat on iOS, so the attacker supplies the whole file. This results in a small upload costing hundreds of megabytes of memory and of disk, and in the process being killed where that exceeds what is available.

Why it matters now

Exploitation None reported CISA SSVC · not in CISA KEV
EPSS 0.00138 3rd percentileScored 2026-11-16
Fix Fixed whatstk (lucasrodes): 0.9.0

SSVC decision points

CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3

Exploitation
None
Automatable
No
Technical impact
Partial

The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
lucasrodeswhatstk0.7.0 to before 0.9.00.9.0Patch availableCNA
  • whatstk Vendorlucasrodes Affected 0.7.0 to before 0.9.0 Fixed in 0.9.0 Patch available CNA

Remediation

Upgrade lucasrodes whatstk to version 0.9.0 or later, which is the only fixed version listed.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-11

  • Fix · CNA whatstk (lucasrodes) Fixed in 0.9.0

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-10 Threatist record created from CVE-2026-121691
  2. 2026-11-10 Alias added: GHSA-q683-6fhr-jvg2
  3. 2026-11-12 Priority changed: MEDIUM → LOW
  4. 2026-11-16 CISA SSVC decision points changed

References

  • TI-2026-84557 Unescaped header separators in whatstk cause exponential regex backtracking CVSS 4.0MEDIUM 6.7
  • TI-2026-84373 whatstk merge silently drops messages whose dates overlap another chat CVSS 4.0LOW 1.8

Sources