Kernel stack information disclosure in Zephyr charger_get_prop() system call
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Local
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- Information disclosure
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- Low · None · None
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · CNA. Fix status from CNA. Impact type from CWE-908 and the CVSS impact.
Summary
Zephyr through versions before 4.3.2 and from 4.4.0 before 4.5.0 leaks kernel stack memory from the charger_get_prop() system call handler. An unprivileged user-mode thread that has access to a charger device object can call the handler with any property identifier, and the copy-out of an uninitialized union returns supervisor stack residue on both error and success paths. The leaked bytes can contain kernel object addresses and saved return addresses (CWE-908, CWE-252). The attack requires a local user-mode thread with low privileges, and there is no integrity or availability impact.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
Description from the CNA
The user-mode system call verifier z_vrfy_charger_get_prop() in drivers/charger/charger_handlers.c declares an uninitialized union charger_propval k_val on the kernel (privileged) stack, passes it to the charger driver back end via z_impl_charger_get_prop(), and then copies the full sizeof(union charger_propval) back into the calling user thread's buffer with k_usermode_to_copy(). That discloses kernel stack contents on two paths: On error. The copy-out ignores the driver's return code. In-tree back ends return an error without writing through the value pointer for properties they do not implement: charger_gpio_get_prop() returns -ENOTSUP unconditionally, and bq24190_get_prop() has a default: return -ENOTSUP; arm that never touches val. The whole union is then stack residue. On success. A back end writes only the one union member the requested property selects (for example sbs_charger.c writes the one-byte val->present for CHARGER_PROP_PRESENT and returns 0), yet the handler still copies the whole union, so every byte beyond that member is uninitialized. The handler is compiled only when CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and is reachable by any user-mode thread that has been granted access to a charger device object. K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_CHARGER() validates only the device object and its API pointer, not the property identifier, so an unprivileged thread can choose prop freely: an unimplemented property forces the error path, a narrow one the success path, and the call can be repeated at will. Each call discloses up to the size of the union (12 bytes on a 32-bit target, 16 bytes on 64-bit targets where the function-pointer members widen it) of supervisor-stack memory. The bytes are residue of earlier kernel-side frames on the thread's privileged stack and can contain kernel object addresses and saved return addresses, which an unprivileged thread cannot otherwise observe and which help defeat address-layout assumptions when exploiting a separate memory-safety defect. There is no integrity or availability impact. Two commits fix it, and both are needed. 5054384e983c skips the copy-out when the back end reports an error. c31cac727d02 zeroes the union before the driver call, so the bytes copied out on success are driver-written data or zeros. A tree carrying only the first still leaks on every successful call.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr | 3.5.0 to before 4.3.2; 4.4.0 to before 4.5.0 | 4.3.2, 4.5.0 | Patch available | CNA |
- zephyr Vendorzephyrproject Affected 3.5.0 to before 4.3.2; 4.4.0 to before 4.5.0 Fixed in 4.3.2, 4.5.0 Patch available CNA
CPE names Threatist (inferred) · 1
Inferred from how NVD named this product before; not given by a source.
| CPE | Versions | Role | Vendor |
|---|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | — | — | zephyrproject |
- cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* Versions — — ·zephyrproject
Remediation
Upgrade zephyr to version 4.3.2 or 4.5.0. The fix requires both upstream commits 5054384e983c and c31cac727d02, so a tree carrying only the first still leaks on successful calls.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
- Fix · CNA zephyr (zephyrproject) Fixed in 4.3.2, 4.5.0
Fixed in the same release
Records fixed by the same vendor advisory or release, as the CNA lists them.
- Release ·
zephyrproject zephyr 4.3.2, 4.5.0
2 records Highest priority Priority LOW 2 LOW
Other records, highest priority first
- TI-2026-90394 Zephyr charger API lets user threads inject kernel function pointersPriority LOW 33
Timeline
- 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from CVE-2026-19809
References
More zephyrproject vulnerabilities
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Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences