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Crafted .rdp files pass command-line options to FreeRDP client

Priority LOW 38CWE-88Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
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Privileges required
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User interaction
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Attack complexity
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Impact type
Code execution
Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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Fix status
Fixed

No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-88.

Summary

FreeRDP's .rdp connection file parser treats any line starting with a slash as a raw command-line option and passes it to the full client option parser (CWE-88). A person who authors a crafted .rdp file can set any xfreerdp option, such as disabling TLS certificate checks with /cert:ignore, mounting local directories with /drive, or running a local command through /rdp2tcp when the file is opened.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

Description from the GitHub advisory

## Summary FreeRDP's `.rdp` connection-file parser treats **any line beginning with `/` as a raw command-line option** and appends it verbatim to the argument vector later handed to the full `CLI` parser (`freerdp_client_settings_parse_command_line`). The documented `.rdp` grammar is strictly `name:type:value` (the Microsoft interchange format); this `/`-prefixed fallback is **not documented in the FreeRDP man page or user manual** — which show `CLI` options only *after* the file on the command line (`xfreerdp connection.rdp /p:… /f`) — and it silently exposes the **entire `xfreerdp` option surface** to whoever authored the file. The concrete consequences, in rough order of how hard they are to dismiss as "intended," are: - **`/cert:ignore` — silent TLS-validation bypass.** A `.rdp` file can disable certificate checking with no prompt, so a victim connecting to a man-in-the-middled or spoofed server gets no warning. There is no legitimate reason an interchange file should be able to silently weaken the client's transport security. - **`/drive:...` — local filesystem exposure.** A `.rdp` file can mount the user's local directories into the (attacker-controlled) remote session. - **`/rdp2tcp:<command>` — local command execution.** The `rdp2tcp` channel is *designed* to launch a helper process, so its argument goes straight to `CreateProcessA()` (POSIX: `fork()`+`execve()`). Because channel loading happens inside `freerdp_connect()` **before the TCP/TLS handshake**, merely opening the file runs an attacker-named local command — no server, no certificate, no authentication, even if no RDP server exists. This is the most severe outcome but also the one most easily read as "that option is meant to spawn a process"; the report is really about the *file → full-CLI* exposure that makes it (and the two above) reachable from an untrusted file. The `/rdp2tcp` variant additionally requires the channel to be compiled in (OFF in the bare upstream cmake default, but ON in Debian/Ubuntu packaging); the `/cert:ignore` and `/drive` variants are present in every client build. ## Note on FreeRDP reacting to this * Deprecation of arbitrary `CLI` parsing: The behavior where /-prefixed lines in a `.rdp` file are forwarded to the `CLI` parser will be disabled by default in the next (=3.28.0) release and is officially marked for complete removal in a future major version. `FreeRDP` already supports the /args-from parameter for users who explicitly intend to load command-line arguments from a local file (or `stdin`). * Untrusted paradigm for `.rdp` files: Because `.rdp` files are widespread, standard and expected default options must continue to work. However, we recognize that even standard properties (such as drive redirection drivestoredirect) can be used maliciously to expose local data. Unless a `.rdp` file is signed and verified via a trusted chain, it must be treated as untrusted. For future versions, we will be discussing a model where only a "safe default set" of options is allowed automatically, while risky or potentially problematic options will require an explicit confirmation (such as a specific command-line flag provided by the user). Signature verification isn't implemented yet. * /rdp2tcp: The ability for a `.rdp` file to spawn a helper process via /rdp2tcp is a possible risk. With the argument parsing disabled this should be mitigated. We will be adding a build-time notice regarding this behavior and are planning a future architecture rewrite. On a long term our goal is to deprecate the external binary requirement entirely and move toward an internal tunneling mechanism (similar to SSH -L and -R port forwarding). We've already add a deprecation warning for the next release. ## Compatibility With 3.28.0 the option has been disabled by default, use `-DWITH_EMBEDDED_CLI_IN_RDP_FILES=ON` to enable this behavior again.

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed FreeRDP: N/A

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—FreeRDPN/AN/APatch availableGHSA-rq8f-9xjh-pr3m
  • FreeRDP Vendor— Affected N/A Fixed in N/A Patch available GHSA-rq8f-9xjh-pr3m

Remediation

The sources list no fixed version for FreeRDP. The sources state that FreeRDP will disable this behavior by default in release 3.28.0 and remove it in a future major version, and that the /args-from parameter loads arguments from a local file for users who need that. Until then, treat .rdp files as untrusted unless they are signed and verified through a trusted chain.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

  • Fix · GHSA-rq8f-9xjh-pr3m FreeRDP Fixed in N/A Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-rq8f-9xjh-pr3m

References

Sources

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