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Out-of-bounds read in FreeRDP polygon drawing order async proxy

Priority LOW 38Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
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Privileges required
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User interaction
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Attack complexity
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Impact type
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Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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Fix status
Fixed

No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.

Summary

FreeRDP up to and including 3.28.0 is affected when AsyncUpdate is enabled. The async update message proxy for the PolygonSC and PolygonCB primary drawing orders copies point data from the order structure address instead of the points array, which causes out-of-bounds reads on the client. A malicious or compromised RDP server that sends crafted update orders can trigger the flaw.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

Description from the GitHub advisory

Reporter / credit: Bin Luo, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), [email protected] Target: - Repository: FreeRDP/FreeRDP - Supported release reproduced: 3.28.0 - Reproduction commit: 5370fb26fbf034ecd11d3026b6ad639b5fff493f - Condition: AsyncUpdate enabled, for example xfreerdp `/async-update` - Threat model: malicious or compromised RDP server sending crafted update orders to a client Summary: FreeRDP 3.28.0 contains related client-side out-of-bounds reads in the async update message proxy for primary drawing orders `PolygonSC` and `PolygonCB`. When `AsyncUpdate` is enabled, the proxy allocates a fresh points array but copies point data from the address of the order structure instead of from `polygonSC->points` or `polygonCB->points`. I reproduced both paths on supported release 3.28.0 with AddressSanitizer through the production primary-order parser. Description: `PolygonSC`: ```c CopyMemory(wParam->points, polygonSC, sizeof(DELTA_POINT) * wParam->numPoints); ``` The source should be `polygonSC->points`. Relevant code: - `libfreerdp/core/message.c:716`: `update_message_PolygonSC()` - `libfreerdp/core/message.c:726`: `wParam->numPoints = polygonSC->numPoints` - `libfreerdp/core/message.c:728`: allocates `wParam->points` - `libfreerdp/core/message.c:738`: wrong source pointer in `CopyMemory` - `libfreerdp/core/orders.c:4097`: production parser dispatch reaches `primary->PolygonSC` - `libfreerdp/core/orders.c:4541`: `update_recv_order()` entry used by the reproducer `PolygonCB`: ```c CopyMemory(wParam->points, polygonCB, sizeof(DELTA_POINT) * wParam->numPoints); ``` The source should be `polygonCB->points`. Relevant code: - `libfreerdp/core/message.c:745`: `update_message_PolygonCB()` - `libfreerdp/core/message.c:755`: shallow copy of `POLYGON_CB_ORDER` - `libfreerdp/core/message.c:757`: allocates `wParam->points` - `libfreerdp/core/message.c:767`: wrong source pointer in `CopyMemory` - `libfreerdp/core/orders.c:4105`: production parser dispatch reaches `primary->PolygonCB` - `libfreerdp/core/orders.c:4541`: `update_recv_order()` entry used by the reproducer Reproduction evidence: The reproducers construct real primary `PolygonSC` and `PolygonCB` orders with `numPoints=255` and feed them through: `update_recv_order()` -> `update_recv_primary_order()` -> `update_message_PolygonSC()` / `update_message_PolygonCB()`. Artifacts in my local package: - PolygonSC harness: `docker_repro/freerdp_polygon_sc_message_proxy_wrongcopy_harness.c` - PolygonSC ASan log: `docker_repro/polygon_sc_message_proxy_wrongcopy_asan_run.txt` - PolygonCB harness: `docker_repro/freerdp_polygon_cb_message_proxy_wrongcopy_harness.c` - PolygonCB ASan log: `docker_repro/polygon_cb_message_proxy_wrongcopy_asan_run.txt` Key PolygonSC ASan result: ```text ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow READ of size 2040 #1 update_message_PolygonSC freerdp_3_28_0_src/libfreerdp/core/message.c:738 #2 update_recv_primary_order freerdp_3_28_0_src/libfreerdp/core/orders.c:4097 #3 update_recv_order freerdp_3_28_0_src/libfreerdp/core/orders.c:4541 ``` Key PolygonCB ASan result: ```text ERROR: AddressSanitizer: unknown-crash READ of size 2040 #1 update_message_PolygonCB freerdp_3_28_0_src/libfreerdp/core/message.c:767 #2 update_recv_primary_order freerdp_3_28_0_src/libfreerdp/core/orders.c:4105 #3 update_recv_order freerdp_3_28_0_src/libfreerdp/core/orders.c:4541 0x5220000017c0 is located 0 bytes after 5824-byte region ``` Impact: The confirmed impact is client-side out-of-bounds read before queued async dispatch. The release harnesses did not crash in the minimal runs, which is consistent with an out-of-bounds read whose visible effect depends on memory layout. I am not claiming demonstrated RCE. The likely security impact is client crash or unintended memory disclosure to later rendering callbacks depending on layout and callback behavior. Suggested classification: - CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read - Suggested severity: Moderate-low to Moderate - Affected version: 3.28.0; latest public master was also checked and the wrong-copy patterns still appeared present at the time of testing.

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed FreeRDP (c/c++): 3.29.0

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—FreeRDP (c/c++)<=3.28.03.29.0Patch availableGHSA-vxp3-7g6q-rq2w
  • FreeRDP (c/c++) Vendor— Affected <=3.28.0 Fixed in 3.29.0 Patch available GHSA-vxp3-7g6q-rq2w

Remediation

Update FreeRDP to version 3.29.0 or later, which fixes the flaw.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

  • Fix · GHSA-vxp3-7g6q-rq2w FreeRDP (c/c++) Fixed in 3.29.0 Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-vxp3-7g6q-rq2w

References

Sources

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