Header injection in FreeRDP HTTP proxy CONNECT via redirect target
Key facts
- Attack vector
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- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
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- Impact type
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- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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- Fix status
- Fixed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.
Summary
FreeRDP through 3.28.0 copies a server-supplied redirection TargetNetAddress into the server hostname without rejecting CRLF or other control characters. When the client connects through an HTTP proxy, that hostname is written unfiltered into the CONNECT request line and Host header. A malicious or compromised RDP server can therefore inject extra HTTP proxy request headers.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
Description from the GitHub advisory
## Summary A server-controlled RDP redirection TargetNetAddress can contain CRLF/control characters. The redirect path later copies that value into FreeRDP_ServerHostname. If the client connects through an HTTP proxy, http_proxy_connect() writes the hostname directly into the CONNECT request line and Host header without CRLF filtering, allowing HTTP proxy request/header injection. Reporter / credit: Bin Luo, UESTC ## Confirmed versions - Current master HEAD tested: f3b4347105114fe7453828736bea069999af319f - Supported release checked: 3.28.0 - Relevant files unchanged between 3.28.0 and current master: libfreerdp/core/proxy.c, libfreerdp/core/redirection.c, libfreerdp/core/connection.c, libfreerdp/core/transport.c ## Affected code path Source path: - libfreerdp/core/redirection.c: rdp_recv_enhanced_security_redirection_packet() - libfreerdp/core/redirection.c: rdp_redirection_read_unicode_string() - rdp_redirection_apply_settings() - libfreerdp/core/connection.c: rdp_client_redirect_try_ip() Sink path: - libfreerdp/core/transport.c: transport_connect() - libfreerdp/core/proxy.c: proxy_connect() - libfreerdp/core/proxy.c: http_proxy_connect() ## Root cause rdp_redirection_read_unicode_string() accepts a null-terminated UTF-16 TargetNetAddress with length bounds but no hostname/control-character validation. rdp_client_redirect_try_ip() copies settings->TargetNetAddress into FreeRDP_ServerHostname. http_proxy_connect() then embeds that hostname into: CONNECT <hostname>:<port> HTTP/1.1 Host: <hostname>:<port> without rejecting CRLF/control characters. ## Reproduction evidence I reproduced both the redirection source and the HTTP proxy sink locally. ### Redirection source proof A crafted redirection PDU preserves the injected CRLF sequence: redirection_parse_status=1 contains_crlf=1 parsed=victim:3389 HTTP/1.1 X-Injected: yes STATE_RUN_REDIRECT was returned and the parsed TargetNetAddress retained the injected CRLF sequence. ### HTTP proxy sink proof Control output: case=control proxy_connect=1 read_error=0 request_len=75 expected=75 injected_header=0 CONNECT victim.example.com:3389 HTTP/1.1 Host: victim.example.com:3389 Injected output: case=injected proxy_connect=1 read_error=0 request_len=113 expected=113 injected_header=1 CONNECT victim:3389 HTTP/1.1 X-Injected: yes:3389 HTTP/1.1 Host: victim:3389 HTTP/1.1 X-Injected: yes:3389 production proxy_connect()/http_proxy_connect() emitted a proxy request containing injected headers and returned success after a normal HTTP/1.1 200 proxy response. ## Impact The likely impact is HTTP proxy request/header injection against a proxy configured by the FreeRDP client. This requires: - the client to use an HTTP proxy; - a malicious or compromised RDP server capable of sending a redirection PDU; - proxy behavior that accepts the resulting injected header/request form. I am not claiming memory corruption, RCE, or arbitrary proxy request smuggling beyond the emitted bytes demonstrated above. ## Suggested fix Reject CRLF and other control characters in redirection TargetNetAddress before it can become ServerHostname. Also validate/sanitize hostnames before constructing HTTP proxy CONNECT requests.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | FreeRDP (c/c++) | <= 3.28.0 | 3.29.0 | Patch available | GHSA-mwwh-mhp9-q7vm |
- FreeRDP (c/c++) Vendor— Affected <= 3.28.0 Fixed in 3.29.0 Patch available GHSA-mwwh-mhp9-q7vm
Remediation
Upgrade FreeRDP to version 3.29.0.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
- Fix · GHSA-mwwh-mhp9-q7vm FreeRDP (c/c++) Fixed in 3.29.0 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-mwwh-mhp9-q7vm
References
Sources
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