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Heap out-of-bounds read in FreeRDP glyph fragment handling

Priority LOW 38Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
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Privileges required
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User interaction
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Attack complexity
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Impact type
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Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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Fix status
Fixed

No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.

Summary

FreeRDP through 3.28.0 has a heap out-of-bounds read in its glyph fragment handling. A malicious RDP server can send a short GLYPH_FRAGMENT_ADD payload with a larger declared fragment size, and the client copies bytes past the end of the received buffer. An attacker who controls the RDP server can crash the client with this flaw, and the demonstrated impact is an out-of-bounds read, not code execution.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

Description from the GitHub advisory

## Summary A malicious RDP server can send a short GLYPH_FRAGMENT_ADD payload with a larger declared fragment size. FreeRDP copies the declared size from the original fragment pointer without checking that enough bytes remain, causing a client-side heap out-of-bounds read. Reporter / credit: Bin Luo, UESTC ## Confirmed versions - Current master HEAD tested: f3b4347105114fe7453828736bea069999af319f - Supported release checked: 3.28.0 - Relevant files unchanged between 3.28.0 and current master: libfreerdp/cache/glyph.c and libfreerdp/core/orders.c ## Affected code path - libfreerdp/cache/glyph.c: update_process_glyph_fragments() - libfreerdp/cache/glyph.c: glyph_cache_fragment_put() ## Root cause update_process_glyph_fragments() handles GLYPH_FRAGMENT_ADD by reading only the id and one-byte declared size from server-controlled glyph fragment data. It checks that those two bytes exist, but does not check that the declared size fits inside the remaining received buffer. The parser then calls glyph_cache_fragment_put(glyph_cache, id, size, data). glyph_cache_fragment_put() allocates size bytes and copies size bytes from the original data pointer: void* copy = malloc(size); CopyMemory(copy, fragment, size); With a short fragment buffer such as [GLYPH_FRAGMENT_ADD, id, 0x40], production code copies 64 bytes from a 3-byte heap allocation. ## Reproduction evidence I reproduced this with a local Docker/ASan harness. Control run: declared_size=3 returns successfully without ASan findings Bug run: declared_size=64 triggers ASan heap-buffer-overflow Key ASan stack: READ of size 64 glyph_cache_fragment_put libfreerdp/cache/glyph.c:666 update_process_glyph_fragments libfreerdp/cache/glyph.c:281 main freerdp_glyph_fragment_add_oob_harness.c:117 address is located 0 bytes after 3-byte region ## Impact This is a real reproduced client-side memory-safety bug. The demonstrated impact is out-of-bounds read / client crash from malicious RDP server update data. I am not claiming RCE, an attacker-controlled write primitive, or direct information disclosure beyond the demonstrated OOB read. ## Suggested fix Before calling glyph_cache_fragment_put(), validate that the declared fragment size is no larger than the remaining bytes in the received glyph fragment buffer. Also pass a pointer to the actual fragment payload rather than the original data pointer if appropriate.

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed FreeRDP (c/c++): 3.29.0

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—FreeRDP (c/c++)<= 3.28.03.29.0Patch availableGHSA-hgj8-g595-wfc6
  • FreeRDP (c/c++) Vendor— Affected <= 3.28.0 Fixed in 3.29.0 Patch available GHSA-hgj8-g595-wfc6

Remediation

Upgrade FreeRDP to version 3.29.0, which fixes this issue.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

  • Fix · GHSA-hgj8-g595-wfc6 FreeRDP (c/c++) Fixed in 3.29.0 Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-hgj8-g595-wfc6

References

Sources

This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences