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Reachable assertion in FreeRDP URBDRC libusb path aborts the client

Priority LOW 38CWE-617Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
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Privileges required
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User interaction
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Attack complexity
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Impact type
Denial of service
Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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Fix status
Fixed

No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-617.

Summary

FreeRDP, through 3.30.0, has a reachable assertion in its URBDRC client path with the libusb backend. A malicious RDP server can send a control-transfer request with OutputBufferSize set to 65536, which the parser accepts and forwards to libusb, where a WINPR_ASSERT aborts the client process (CWE-617). The source reports a remote denial of service, not memory corruption.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

Description from the GitHub advisory

I am reporting a remotely reachable denial-of-service issue in the URBDRC/libusb client path of FreeRDP. Summary: A malicious RDP server can send a URBDRC control-transfer request with OutputBufferSize = 65536. This value is accepted by the URBDRC parser and forwarded into the libusb backend, where the process terminates on a reachable WINPR_ASSERT. Validated code path on current master (checked July 22, 2026): - channels/urbdrc/client/data_transfer.c reads OutputBufferSize in the control-transfer request path at line 989. - The value is forwarded without an earlier reject into the libusb backend call at line 1030. - The sink is channels/urbdrc/client/libusb/libusb_udevice.c:1324, which contains: WINPR_ASSERT(*BufferSize <= UINT16_MAX); Why this appears security-relevant: - OutputBufferSize is server-controlled through the URBDRC request. - 65536 is larger than UINT16_MAX by 1, so it deterministically hits the assertion. - If assertions are enabled in the affected build, a malicious server can terminate the client process after the user connects. Impact: This appears to be a remote denial-of-service affecting builds that use the URBDRC libusb path. I am not claiming memory corruption here; the issue is the reachable process abort via assertion. Reproduction summary provided with the finding: - OutputBufferSize = 65536 is accepted by the parser and reaches the sink. - The abort was reported to reproduce in both Debug and non-Debug builds compiled with -DNDEBUG. - The reported crash point is libusb_udev_control_transfer() at libusb_udevice.c:1324. - A dedicated harness was prepared by the finder to confirm forwarding of the value into the assertion path. Additional code context from current master: - channels/urbdrc/client/libusb/libusb_udevice.c also contains a similar BufferSize assertion at line 956 in a different helper, which may be worth reviewing for related DoS cases. Suggested fix direction: - Reject or clamp OutputBufferSize above UINT16_MAX in the URBDRC control-transfer request path before entering the libusb backend. - Replace the reachable assertion with explicit error handling for untrusted input sizes. - Audit nearby URBDRC/libusb paths for the same assumption around 16-bit buffer sizes. Affected scope: - current master as of July 22, 2026 - likely 3.x client builds with URBDRC and the libusb backend enabled

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed FreeRDP: 3.31.0

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—FreeRDP<= 3.30.03.31.0Patch availableGHSA-w9qg-g24r-77f6
  • FreeRDP Vendor— Affected <= 3.30.0 Fixed in 3.31.0 Patch available GHSA-w9qg-g24r-77f6

Remediation

FreeRDP 3.31.0 fixes this issue. Upgrade to FreeRDP 3.31.0 or later.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

  • Fix · GHSA-w9qg-g24r-77f6 FreeRDP Fixed in 3.31.0 Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-w9qg-g24r-77f6

References

Sources

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