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Malicious RDP server can write out of bounds in FreeRDP client

Priority LOW 38CWE-129Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
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Privileges required
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User interaction
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Attack complexity
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Impact type
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Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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Fix status
Fixed

No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.

Summary

FreeRDP up to and including 3.31.1 copies an origin value chosen by the server into an unsigned field without a range check against the local desktop. A malicious RDP server that sends a negative position makes the client write decoded video past the bounds of its display buffer, or abort the connection. This needs the user to connect with the /video option, which is not a default.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

Description from the GitHub advisory

This issue was found by Anthropic using Claude to study the security of open-source software, validated manually by me from Ada Logics. ## Summary The MS-RDPEGT geometry dynamic virtual channel lets the server choose where a video overlay is placed. The client copies the server-chosen signed origin straight into the unsigned `VideoSurface::x` with no range check against the local desktop, and `gdiVideoShowSurface()` performs its blit clamp in wrapping 32-bit unsigned arithmetic. A server that sends `topLevelLeft = -256` makes `surface->x` become `0xFFFFFF00`; the clamp test `destinationWidth + surface->x < gdi->width` then wraps to `0 < 1024`, the clamp is skipped, and the full width is copied to `nXDst = 0xFFFFFF00`. `freerdp_image_scale()` takes its equal-size fast path into `freerdp_image_copy_no_overlap()`, whose row offset is `nXDst * bytesPerPixel` computed in 64-bit — about 16 GiB — and the decoded H.264 picture rows are written there. On the upstream-default build (`WITH_VERBOSE_WINPR_ASSERT=ON`) the `WINPR_ASSERTING_INT_CAST` in `video_PresentationRequest()` turns the negative origin into a fatal abort instead, which is still a server-triggered termination of the connecting client. Affected component: client, `/video` channel (MS-RDPEVOR) plus the geometry channel (MS-RDPEGT). This requires the user to connect with `/video`, which is not a default. ## Affected code At master `a0114ebd34c71334a028f267acf6da391edbbe24`: `libfreerdp/gdi/video.c:89-94` — `gdiVideoShowSurface()` ```c const UINT32 width = (destinationWidth + surface->x < (UINT32)gdi->width) ? destinationWidth : (UINT32)gdi->width - surface->x; const UINT32 height = (destinationHeight + surface->y < (UINT32)gdi->height) ? destinationHeight : (UINT32)gdi->height - surface->y; ``` `nXDst`/`nYDst` are `surface->x`/`surface->y` verbatim; the `nXDst > INT32_MAX` test at `video.c:105-107` runs after `freerdp_image_scale()` at `video.c:100` has already copied. `channels/video/client/video_main.c:426-430` and `:499-501` — the origin ```c presentation->surface->x = WINPR_ASSERTING_INT_CAST(uint32_t, geometry->topLevelLeft + geometry->left); ``` `topLevelLeft` / `left` are `INT32`s read verbatim from the wire in `geometry_recv_pdu()` (`channels/geometry/client/geometry_main.c:251-259`); only the RGNDATA rectangles are range checked there, not these fields. The only guard is the assert layer. `WINPR_ASSERTING_INT_CAST` (`winpr/include/winpr/cast.h:179`) is two `WINPR_ASSERT`s plus a plain cast; with `WITH_VERBOSE_WINPR_ASSERT=OFF` it becomes the libc `assert()`, which `NDEBUG` removes in a Release build. FreeRDP's own Android client build sets `-DWITH_VERBOSE_WINPR_ASSERT:BOOL=OFF` (`client/Android/cmake/ExternalFreeRDP.cmake:45`), as do the `config-qa-static` and `config-abi` CI presets, and the macro degenerates to a plain cast on non-GNU/Clang compilers (`winpr/include/winpr/cast.h:189-190`). The `WINPR_ASSERT`s inside `freerdp_image_scale()` (`color.c:1297-1306`) and `freerdp_image_copy_no_overlap()` (`color.c:1986-1995`) are the same layer. CWE-190 (integer overflow / wraparound) leading to CWE-787 (out-of-bounds write); CWE-129 (improper validation of array index) for the unchecked geometry origin. ## Primitive Write, attacker-chosen bytes (the decoded picture), `width * 4` bytes per row for `height` rows. The displacement is not tunable: the wraparound that creates the bug requires `surface->x >= 0xFFFFFF00`, so the write always lands at least ~16 GiB past `gdi->primary_buffer`. In a normal 64-bit address space that page is unmapped, so the realistic outcome is a crash of the client rather than usable corruption. We are reporting this as a server-triggered client denial of service. ## Evidence Validated end-to-end at release-3.23.0 (`b933ae18d9ad2a1d73c610868fcc30eb61654070`), assert-disabled Release build, ASan, using FreeRDP's own `sfreerdp` client against a malicious server built on the public FreeRDP server API: ``` [server] -> GEOMETRY_UPDATE id=0x1122334455667788 topLevelLeft=-256 left=0 (104 bytes) [server] -> TSMM_PRESENTATION_REQUEST START id=1 256x256 -> 256x256 mapping=0x1122334455667788 [server] -> TSMM_VIDEO_DATA id=1 sampleNumber=1 cbSample=710 ==31==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x770ab26ad420 (pc 0x7b06c57f6c10 ...) ==31==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access. #0 in FreeRDPWriteColor_int build/./libfreerdp/primitives/../codec/color.h:42:11 #1 in generic_image_copy_no_overlap_convert build/./libfreerdp/primitives/prim_copy.c:252:4 #2 in generic_image_copy_no_overlap build/./libfreerdp/primitives/prim_copy.c #3 in avx2_image_copy_no_overlap build/./libfreerdp/primitives/sse/prim_copy_avx2.c #4 in freerdp_image_copy_no_overlap build/./libfreerdp/codec/color.c:1890:9 #5 in freerdp_image_scale build/./libfreerdp/codec/color.c:1237:10 #6 in gdiVideoShowSurface build/./libfreerdp/gdi/video.c:100:8 #7 in video_VideoData build/./channels/video/client/video_main.c:876:9 #8 in video_data_on_data_received build/./channels/video/client/video_main.c:999:9 #9 in drdynvc_process_data build/./channels/drdynvc/client/drdynvc_main.c:1432:11 #11 in drdynvc_virtual_channel_client_thread build/./channels/drdynvc/client/drdynvc_main.c:1689:17 rsi = 0x00000003fffffc00 <- xDstOffset = 0xFFFFFF00 * 4 = 16 GiB SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV build/./libfreerdp/primitives/../codec/color.h:42:11 in FreeRDPWriteColor_int ``` On the upstream-default build of the same tree, the same three PDUs abort the client first: ``` [FATAL][com.freerdp.winpr.assert] - [winpr_int_assert]: ... [channels/video/client/video_main.c:video_PresentationRequest:500] >>> RESULT: client killed by SIGABRT ``` ## Status at current master, and a caveat we want to flag The `gdiVideoShowSurface()` and `video_main.c` code is unchanged at `a0114ebd34c71334a028f267acf6da391edbbe24`. On the upstream-default build the PoC still terminates the client there with the `SIGABRT` shown above. The out-of-bounds write itself is currently not reached on master, but not because of any bound on the geometry. `video_main.c:884-886` decodes with `rect = {0, 0, surface->alignedWidth, surface->alignedHeight}`, and `VideoClient_CreateCommonContext()` (`libfreerdp/gdi/video.c:174-175`) computes `alignedWidth = w + 32 - w % 16`, which is always greater than `w`. `log_decompress()` (`libfreerdp/codec/h264.c:164-167`) validates that rect against `h264->width/height`, which `h264_context_reset()` set to the presentation's `SourceWidth/SourceHeight` (`= w`). The rect can therefore never be valid, `avc420_decompress()` returns `-1016`, and every frame is dropped: ``` [WARN][com.freerdp.codec] - [areRectsValid]: Rectangle 0 {0x0-288x288} outside of bounding frame 256x256 ``` That check arrived with `6482b7a92` (3.24.0), `f6380daa9` (3.29.0) and `bea10804a` (3.31.1). Before `6482b7a92`, `avc420_decompress()` did no rect validation, which is why the write reproduces at 3.23.0. As a side effect it looks like the `/video` channel decodes nothing at all in 3.24.0 and later; we mention it because it is the only thing currently standing between the unchecked geometry and the copy, and it is not a bound anyone intended. ## Reproduction [ANT-2026-0H3M36C1-e2e.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32196424/ANT-2026-0H3M36C1-e2e.zip) Reproducer attached as `ANT-2026-0H3M36C1-e2e.zip`. ``` unzip ANT-2026-0H3M36C1-e2e.zip && cd ANT-2026-0H3M36C1 # end-to-end out-of-bounds write (release-3.23.0, the Dockerfile default) docker build -t ant-0h3m36c1 docker-e2e/ && docker run --rm ant-0h3m36c1 # current master: same PoC, upstream-default build -> SIGABRT in video_PresentationRequest docker build --build-arg TARGET_COMMIT=a0114ebd34c71334a028f267acf6da391edbbe24 \ -t ant-0h3m36c1-head docker-e2e/ && docker run --rm ant-0h3m36c1-head ``` No special `docker run` flags are needed. The image builds FreeRDP twice from the same unmodified checkout of `${TARGET_COMMIT}` (upstream-default assert-on, and assert-off Release matching the Android client configuration), compiles a malicious server against the installed `freerdp-server3`/`freerdp3`/`winpr3` pkg-config modules, generates a self-signed certificate and a 256x256 H.264 keyframe with `ffmpeg`, then runs `sfreerdp` against that server in both configurations. No FreeRDP source is patched, stubbed or reimplemented. The malicious server opens `Microsoft::Windows::RDS::Geometry::v08.01`, `Microsoft::Windows::RDS::Video::Control::v08.01` and `Microsoft::Windows::RDS::Video::Data::v08.01` and sends, in order, a `GEOMETRY_UPDATE` with `topLevelLeft = -256` / `left = 0`, a `TSMM_PRESENTATION_REQUEST` (START, H.264, `SourceWidth == ScaledWidth == SourceHeight == ScaledHeight == 256`, so the equal-size direct-copy path is taken), and one `TSMM_VIDEO_DATA`. ## Credit Found by Anthropic using Claude to study the security of open-source software, validated manually by Ada Logics. Please credit Claude and Ada Logics in any advisory. Handled under Anthropic's coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy (https://www.anthropic.com/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure, 90 days). Reference ANT-2026-0H3M36C1; questions to [email protected].

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed FreeRDP (c): 3.32.0

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—FreeRDP (c)<= 3.31.13.32.0Patch availableGHSA-grvc-qhhp-7h6m
  • FreeRDP (c) Vendor— Affected <= 3.31.1 Fixed in 3.32.0 Patch available GHSA-grvc-qhhp-7h6m

Remediation

Upgrade FreeRDP to version 3.32.0, which fixes this issue.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

  • Fix · GHSA-grvc-qhhp-7h6m FreeRDP (c) Fixed in 3.32.0 Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-grvc-qhhp-7h6m

References

Sources

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