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Heap out-of-bounds read in FreeRDP Remote Assistance file parsing

Priority LOW 38CWE-125Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
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Privileges required
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User interaction
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Attack complexity
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Impact type
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Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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Fix status
Fixed

No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub.

Summary

FreeRDP, with last known affected version 3.31.1, has a heap out-of-bounds read (CWE-125) when parsing Remote Assistance .msrcIncident files. A recursive element walker advances its read position without reducing the remaining length, so scanning reads past the end of the decrypted buffer. A remote party who sends a victim a crafted invitation file and its password can crash the FreeRDP client when the file is opened.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

Description from the GitHub advisory

This issue was found by Anthropic using Claude to study the security of open-source software, validated manually by me from Ada Logics. ## Summary FreeRDP clients accept Microsoft Remote Assistance invitation files (`.msrcIncident`). When such a file is passed to a client, `freerdp_assistance_parse_file_buffer()` parses it, decrypts the `LHTICKET` blob with the invitation password, and hands the resulting ConnectionString2 XML to a recursive element walker, `freerdp_assistance_parse_all_elements_of()`. That walker advances its cursor past each element it consumes but never subtracts the consumed byte count from the remaining-length counter. The scan window `[data, data + len)` therefore grows past the end of the heap buffer that holds the decrypted string, and the `strnlen()` that re-derives the length is itself the operation that reads out of bounds. A remote party who hands a victim an invitation file and its password (email, chat, download — the normal distribution channel for these files) triggers a heap over-read in the stock `xfreerdp` client the moment the file is opened, before any RDP connection is attempted. The demonstrated effect is a client-side crash. ## Affected code At current master `43e8453d121709811051522d1d383b265c0bb63c`: `libfreerdp/common/assistance.c:669-687` — `freerdp_assistance_parse_all_elements_of()` ```c while (freerdp_assistance_get_element(data, len, key, &val, &vlen)) { data = val + vlen; // :679 cursor advances by (val+vlen)-data len = strnlen(data, len); // :680 but len is only re-derived, using the OLD len as bound if (vlen > 0) { val[vlen - 1] = '\0'; if (!fkt(file, val, vlen)) return FALSE; } } ``` `data` and `len` are meant to describe one buffer window. Each iteration moves `data` forward but `len` is not reduced by the same distance, so the window end `data + len` moves forward by exactly the number of bytes consumed on every iteration. Once the consumed distance pushes `data + len` past the end of the allocation, `strnlen(data, len)` reads out of bounds — it stops early only if it happens to meet a NUL first. The over-read buffer is the caller's own allocation, `strlen(ConnectionString2) + 1` bytes: `libfreerdp/common/assistance.c:762` — `freerdp_assistance_parse_connection_string2()` ```c char* str = _strdup(file->ConnectionString2); ``` The bounds guard inside `freerdp_assistance_get_element()` (`assistance.c:660`, `if (tag + len > input + ilen) return FALSE;`) does not help, because `input + ilen` is itself the already-inflated window end and is out of bounds by the time the loop has advanced a few times. Reachable path (all frames in the shipped client, nothing mocked): `main` → `freerdp_client_settings_parse_command_line` → ... → `freerdp_client_settings_parse_assistance_file` (`client/common/client.c:473`) → `freerdp_assistance_parse_file` → `..._parse_file_buffer` → `..._parse_uploadinfo` → `freerdp_assistance_decrypt2` (`assistance.c:1016`) → `freerdp_assistance_parse_connection_string2` (`:784`, buffer allocated at `:762`) → `..._parse_find_elements_of_c` → `freerdp_assistance_parse_all_elements_of` (`:680`, the over-read). CWE-125 (out-of-bounds read). ## Primitive Read, one byte per step (a `strnlen` scan), whose result is only used as a length for subsequent element lookups — the scanned bytes are not returned to or placed by the attacker, so this is not a direct information-disclosure primitive. The attacker controls where the scan starts and its bound; the scan runs past the end of an allocation whose size is the length of the attacker's own decrypted ConnectionString2 (tens to a few hundred bytes for a realistic invitation). The realistic outcome is a crash of the client process while opening the file. We report this as a client-side denial of service. A secondary, undemonstrated concern: if a later iteration's `freerdp_assistance_get_element()` succeeds on out-of-bounds bytes, the loop performs `val[vlen - 1] = '\0'`, a single-NUL out-of-bounds write. Whether that is reachable depends on heap contents adjacent to the allocation; we did not demonstrate it and this report claims only the read. ## Evidence Validated end-to-end through the shipped `xfreerdp` binary (default build, AddressSanitizer) on a 284-byte crafted invitation file, at released tag 3.30.0 (`6b107f0aadbabc47941c5a5b893b88c01792af6d`) and at master. The decrypted ConnectionString2 is `<E><A/><C>ZZZZZZZ</C><C></C></E><C>X</C>` (40 chars → a 41-byte `_strdup`); the trailing `<C>X</C>` after `</E>` is what leaves consumable element text beyond the window the walker was told about. ``` ==8==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7b3e8e1e5739 ... READ of size 1 at 0x7b3e8e1e5739 thread T0 #0 in strnlen #1 in freerdp_assistance_parse_all_elements_of libfreerdp/common/assistance.c:680:9 #2 in freerdp_assistance_parse_find_elements_of_c assistance.c:749:9 #3 in freerdp_assistance_parse_connection_string2 assistance.c:784:9 #4 in freerdp_assistance_decrypt2 assistance.c:1016:7 #5 in freerdp_assistance_parse_uploadinfo assistance.c:1145:9 #6 in freerdp_assistance_parse_file_buffer_int assistance.c:1190:10 #7 in freerdp_assistance_parse_file_buffer assistance.c:1233:17 #8 in freerdp_assistance_parse_file assistance.c:1293:11 #9 in freerdp_client_settings_parse_assistance_file client/common/client.c:473:11 ... #15 in main client/X11/cli/xfreerdp.c:78:11 0x7b3e8e1e5739 is located 0 bytes after 41-byte region [0x7b3e8e1e5710,0x7b3e8e1e5739) allocated by _strdup <- freerdp_assistance_parse_connection_string2 assistance.c:762:14 ``` ## Status at current master The defect is unchanged at master `43e8453d121709811051522d1d383b265c0bb63c`: the cursor/length skew is at `assistance.c:679-680`, and the reproducer fires there. It is present in released 3.28.0, 3.29.0 and 3.30.0 as well. ## Reproduction [ANT-2026-BFD51MRM-e2e.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32198131/ANT-2026-BFD51MRM-e2e.zip) Reproducer attached as `ANT-2026-BFD51MRM-e2e.zip`. It builds unmodified upstream FreeRDP from source at the pinned commit on `ubuntu:24.04` under clang/AddressSanitizer and runs the stock `xfreerdp` on the crafted file. No source patching, no mocking, no harness. ``` unzip ANT-2026-BFD51MRM-e2e.zip && cd ANT-2026-BFD51MRM docker build -t ant-bfd51mrm docker-e2e/ && docker run --rm ant-bfd51mrm # released 3.30.0 instead of master: docker build --build-arg TARGET_COMMIT=6b107f0aadbabc47941c5a5b893b88c01792af6d \ -t ant-bfd51mrm-330 docker-e2e/ && docker run --rm ant-bfd51mrm-330 ``` The container runs `xfreerdp poc.msrcIncident /assistance:48BJQ853X3B4`; the assistance file is parsed during command-line handling, before any display or connection is needed. ## Credit Found by Anthropic using Claude to study the security of open-source software, validated manually by Ada Logics. Please credit Claude and Ada Logics in any advisory. Handled under Anthropic's coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy (https://www.anthropic.com/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure, 90 days). Reference ANT-2026-BFD51MRM; questions to [email protected].

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed FreeRDP (c): 3.32.0

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—FreeRDP (c)<= 3.31.13.32.0Patch availableGHSA-gvq8-v2fm-ffxv
  • FreeRDP (c) Vendor— Affected <= 3.31.1 Fixed in 3.32.0 Patch available GHSA-gvq8-v2fm-ffxv

Remediation

Upgrade FreeRDP to version 3.32.0.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

  • Fix · GHSA-gvq8-v2fm-ffxv FreeRDP (c) Fixed in 3.32.0 Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-gvq8-v2fm-ffxv

References

Sources

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