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FreeRDP sends cleartext password to server in restricted admin mode

Priority LOW 38CWE-522Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
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Privileges required
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User interaction
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Attack complexity
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Impact type
Information disclosure
Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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Fix status
Fixed

No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-522.

Summary

FreeRDP up to and including 3.31.1 sends the administrator password to the RDP server when a client runs with /restricted-admin and /p:. Restricted admin mode sets its own flag but not the flag that disables credential delegation, so the client writes the cleartext username, domain and password into the CredSSP authentication data (CWE-522). The destination host therefore receives a reusable secret that restricted admin mode is meant to withhold.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

Description from the GitHub advisory

This issue was found by Anthropic using Claude to study the security of open-source software, validated manually by me from Ada Logics. ### Summary `/restricted-admin` sets `FreeRDP_RestrictedAdminModeRequired`, which makes the client advertise `RESTRICTED_ADMIN_MODE_REQUIRED` in the RDP negotiation request. It does not set `FreeRDP_DisableCredentialsDelegation`. `nla_encode_ts_password_credentials()` decides whether to emit real credentials from `settings->DisableCredentialsDelegation` alone, and never consults `RestrictedAdminModeRequired`, so a client started with `/restricted-admin` together with `/p:<password>` serialises the cleartext `domainName`, `userName` and `password` into `TSPasswordCreds` and delivers them to the server in the CredSSP `authInfo`. MS-RDPBCGR 2.2.1.1.1 describes the flag as "the client requires credential-less logon over CredSSP (also known as 'restricted admin mode')". The point of that mode is that the destination host — the party assumed to be compromised in a bastion/jump-host deployment — does not receive a reusable secret. In FreeRDP it receives the administrator's plaintext password. ### Root cause `restricted-admin` (`client/common/cmdline.c:5034`) sets only `FreeRDP_ConsoleSession` and `FreeRDP_RestrictedAdminModeRequired`. `FreeRDP_DisableCredentialsDelegation` stays at its `settings_new()` default of `FALSE` (`libfreerdp/core/settings.c:1024`); the only CLI path that ever sets it is the separately-spelled `-credentials-delegation` option (`client/common/cmdline.c:4905`). `nla_client_setup_identity()` (`libfreerdp/core/nla.c:408-426`) special-cases restricted admin only for the pass-the-hash input shape; with `/p:` it takes the `usePassword` branch and loads the literal password into `nla->identity->Password`. The encoder then gates on the wrong flag: ```c /* libfreerdp/core/nla.c:1758 */ if (!settings->DisableCredentialsDelegation && nla->identity) { username.len = nla->identity->UserLength * sizeof(WCHAR); username.data = (BYTE*)nla->identity->User; domain.len = nla->identity->DomainLength * sizeof(WCHAR); domain.data = (BYTE*)nla->identity->Domain; password.len = nla->identity->PasswordLength * sizeof(WCHAR); password.data = (BYTE*)nla->identity->Password; } ``` Two related observations from the same run: 1. Even with `-credentials-delegation`, which does blank `TSPasswordCreds`, the password still reaches the server in the Client Info PDU: `connection.c:477-481` enables `AutoLogonEnabled` whenever `Username` and `Password` are set, and `info.c:992-1006` writes `cbPassword`/`passwordW` into the PDU. Under `/restricted-admin` both channels carry the secret. 2. The client parses but never enforces the server's `RESTRICTED_ADMIN_MODE_SUPPORTED` response flag — `RESTRICTED_ADMIN_MODE_SUPPORTED` appears only at the server emit site (`nego.c:1583`) and in a log-formatting helper (`nego.c:1376`). A server that does not advertise support still receives the credentials. This second point is from source reading only; it cannot be exhibited against a FreeRDP-based peer, because a FreeRDP server rejects the connection outright when it does not advertise support (`nego.c:1297-1309`). ### Primitive shape | Aspect | Value | |---|---| | Direction | Outbound disclosure, client to server | | Data | Full `Domain` / `Username` / `Password` UTF-16 strings, unbounded length | | Attacker role | Recipient (the RDP server), not the shaper of the data | | Precondition | Victim runs a FreeRDP client with `/restricted-admin` and supplies a password (`/p:` or the interactive prompt) | | Reachability | Shipped client binaries in a default build via a documented option; `client/common/cmdline.c` is shared by `xfreerdp`, `sfreerdp`, SDL, Wayland, macOS and Android clients | | Impact | A compromised or MITM'd destination host obtains a reusable administrative credential that restricted admin mode is intended to withhold | CWE-522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials); contributing, the opt-in mitigation is never applied to the code path it is meant to govern (CWE-665-adjacent, incorrect initialisation of a security-relevant setting). ### Validated evidence Run at `7e0a52a12449fc8a6ca1b108c22ffec47cbeba28`. Both endpoints are real FreeRDP: the client is FreeRDP's own `sfreerdp` sample-client binary driven only through its public command line; the server is a small consumer of FreeRDP's public server API that lets unmodified `libfreerdp` run the entire TLS + CredSSP + `TSCredentials` exchange and then prints `FreeRDP_Domain` / `FreeRDP_Username` / `FreeRDP_Password`, which is exactly where `nla_read_ts_credentials()` (`libfreerdp/core/nla.c:1426`) stores the delegated values. No FreeRDP source is patched, stubbed or reimplemented. ``` # CASE: VULNERABLE: /restricted-admin together with a plaintext password # client: sfreerdp /v:127.0.0.1:3389 /cert:ignore +auth-only /u:admin /p:SuperSecret123! /restricted-admin [INFO][com.freerdp.core.nego] - [nego_process_negotiation_request]: RDP_NEG_REQ::flags RESTRICTED_ADMIN_MODE_REQUIRED =========== server-side credential snapshot #1 (server settings after CredSSP TSCredentials decode) =========== domainName [0] : "" userName [1] : "admin" password [2] : "SuperSecret123!" RESULT: PLAINTEXT PASSWORD RECEIVED BY THE SERVER ============================================================== ``` Control, same client and server, delegation explicitly turned off: ``` # CASE: CONTROL: credential delegation explicitly disabled (-credentials-delegation) # client: sfreerdp /v:127.0.0.1:3389 /cert:ignore +auth-only /u:admin /p:SuperSecret123! /restricted-admin -credentials-delegation =========== server-side credential snapshot #1 (server settings after CredSSP TSCredentials decode) =========== domainName [0] : "" userName [1] : "" password [2] : "" RESULT: password field is empty (credential delegation suppressed) ``` Snapshot `#1` in each case is the decoded `TSPasswordCreds`. The later snapshots in the full output show the Client Info PDU re-delivering the password in both cases, per observation (1) above. ### Reproduction [ANT-2026-0EBDJ2HV-e2e.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32213839/ANT-2026-0EBDJ2HV-e2e.zip) ``` unzip ANT-2026-0EBDJ2HV-e2e.zip && cd ANT-2026-0EBDJ2HV docker build -t ant-2026-0ebdj2hv docker-e2e/ docker run --rm ant-2026-0ebdj2hv ``` No special `docker run` flags are needed. The image builds FreeRDP from source at `ARG TARGET_COMMIT=7e0a52a12449fc8a6ca1b108c22ffec47cbeba28`; pass `--build-arg TARGET_COMMIT=<sha>` to build the same reproducer at any other commit. Reproducer attached as `ANT-2026-0EBDJ2HV-e2e.zip`. ### Scope notes, stated plainly The attacker must be the destination endpoint: a compromised host, or an on-path attacker with a certificate the client accepts. In the absence of `/restricted-admin`, delegating credentials over CredSSP is correct RDP behaviour, so the defect is that an opt-in mitigation is silently inert, not an unconditional leak. MS-RDPBCGR words the flag permissively ("it is acceptable for the client to send empty credentials") rather than as a requirement. The test server holds the user's NT hash in its NTLM SAM so that it can complete the handshake; that is a property of NTLM, and it matches reality — a compromised domain-member server receives the NTLM session key from the DC through pass-through authentication, and a Kerberos service holds its own service key, so a real compromised destination can decrypt `authInfo` the same way. We rate this Medium; the final severity is yours to set. ### Disclosure Found by Anthropic using Claude to study the security of open-source software, validated manually by Ada Logics. Handled under Anthropic's coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy (https://www.anthropic.com/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure, 90 days). Please credit Claude and Ada Logics in any advisory.

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed FreeRDP (c): 3.32.0

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—FreeRDP (c)<= 3.31.13.32.0Patch availableGHSA-jhxw-3hj9-9hqh
  • FreeRDP (c) Vendor— Affected <= 3.31.1 Fixed in 3.32.0 Patch available GHSA-jhxw-3hj9-9hqh

Remediation

Upgrade FreeRDP to 3.32.0, which fixes the issue.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

  • Fix · GHSA-jhxw-3hj9-9hqh FreeRDP (c) Fixed in 3.32.0 Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-jhxw-3hj9-9hqh

References

Sources

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