Organization members could forge the sender of a group direct message
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- —
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- None · High · None
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · GHSA-42mq-rxcr-wj72. Fix status from GitHub.
Summary
Zulip server versions before 12.3 let any organization member send a group direct message that appears to come from a different user. The flaw is in the mirroring API, which accepts a forged sender only when the sign-up restriction to specific email domains is configured and certain email visibility settings allow it. An attacker needs a regular account and must send through the API, and the forged message can only be placed into a conversation that includes the attacker. The issue affects integrity only and does not expose private messages or other data.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
Description from the GitHub advisory
### Impact In an affected organization, any member could send a group direct message that appears to have been sent by a different user. The fabricated message would be stored and delivered as a normal direct message, displayed under the impersonated person's name with no indication to recipients that it did not come from them. The same flaw let a member bypass restrictions on who is permitted to send or initiate direct messages, by attributing the message to a user who is allowed to. This was only possible through the API, by forging a specific client identifier, and not through Zulip's web, desktop, or mobile apps. This required a specific configuration of settings in order to be exploitable: - The organization must restrict account creation to a list of domains - The impersonated user's email visibility must generally be set to permit everyone to see the email address. On installations where the organization's own hostname is one of the restricted email domains, this condition does not apply and any user may be impersonated. Additionally the forged message wass restricted by the following conditions: - The impersonated sender account's email address must be within the aforementioned email domains - The message must be a direct message whose conversation includes the attacker's account. A 1-1 direct message is technically possible - the attacker Bob can forge a message from Charlie into their own 1-1 thread with Charlie - but this is of little use, since the only viewer who isn't the attacker is Charlie. The meaningful case is a group direct message with at least one other recipient. For example, Bob can forge a message appearing as if sent by Charlie, but only into a group containing `{Alice, Bob, Charlie}` (or a superset) - never a conversation Bob is not part of. This is an integrity issue only - it does not grant the attacker access to any private messages, channels, or other data they could not already see. ### Severity CVSS 6.5 (Medium); note that CVSS does not capture the impersonation and non-repudiation aspects, which we consider the more serious real-world impact. ### Workarounds A possible mitigation is to explicitly remove the email domains configured for the aforementioned sign-up restriction. The vulnerable mirroring API only accepts a forged sender whose email domain is one of those configured, so with none configured it cannot be used. Note that simply disabling the sign-up restriction by itself is not enough: the configured domains remain in place. Removing the last domain turns the restriction off automatically. To compensate, organizations can [require an invitation to join](https://zulip.com/help/restrict-account-creation#set-whether-invitations-are-required-to-join) and use [email invitations](https://zulip.com/help/invite-new-users#send-email-invitations) to control which email addresses users can register with. ### References - [Restricting account creation to specific email domains](https://zulip.com/help/restrict-account-creation#configuring-email-domain-restrictions) - [Configuring email address visibility](https://zulip.com/help/configure-email-visibility) - [Restricting direct messages](https://zulip.com/help/restrict-direct-messages)
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | Zulip server | < 12.3 | 12.3 | Patch available | GHSA-42mq-rxcr-wj72 |
- Zulip server Vendor— Affected < 12.3 Fixed in 12.3 Patch available GHSA-42mq-rxcr-wj72
Remediation
Upgrade Zulip server to version 12.3, which fixes the flaw. The sources list no fixed version for other Zulip server releases. As a workaround, remove the email domains configured for the sign-up restriction, since the vulnerable API accepts a forged sender only when such a domain is configured.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
- Fix · GHSA-42mq-rxcr-wj72 Zulip server Fixed in 12.3 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-42mq-rxcr-wj72
References
Sources
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