Multiple filter operators reach the Elasticsearch script/query engine from user input…
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- Code execution
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- High · None · Low
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · GHSA-2j3w-4m6x-38ff. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-94.
Summary
### Summary OpenCTI builds Elasticsearch queries from user-supplied filters. Several filter operators passed user-controlled input to the search engine's scripting and query layer without sufficient validation, escaping or gating. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-35211, which only covered the value of the `script` operator. The following operators were affected: - `only_eq_to` / `not_only_eq_to`: the filter key was interpolated into a Painless expression, allowing script injection. - `internal_script`: this operator was meant to be internal only, but its value was executed as a full Painless script with no `isEsScriptFilterEnabled()` gate. It could be reached through inputs that accept a filter group as a raw JSON string (for example background tasks, public data feeds, TAXII collections, retention rules and dashboard widgets). - `wildcard` / `not_wildcard` (top-level filters): the value was not escaped, allowing Lucene `query_string` injection. ### Impact An authenticated user with a standard analyst role could execute attacker-controlled Painless or Lucene in the search engine. In some configurations, such as public feeds, this was possible without authentication. Consequences include: - Boolean-oracle disclosure of arbitrary fields of indexed documents, including attributes not exposed through the API. For regular users this is bounded by their own access restrictions. In system contexts (e.g. retention rules, public feeds) there is no such bound. - Bypass of the `isEsScriptFilterEnabled()` control introduced for CVE-2026-35211. - Denial of service through expensive scripts or wildcard/regex queries. Painless is sandboxed, so no host-level code execution is known. ### Patches Fixed in OpenCTI **7.260807.0**: filter keys are validated and the `only_eq_to` script is parametrized, `internal_script` is no longer reachable from user input, and top-level wildcard values are escaped. The fix is backported to the LTS branch in 7.260309.0-lts.7. Users should upgrade to the latest release of their branch. ### Workarounds There is no complete workaround other than upgrading. Until then, you can reduce exposure by: - disabling or restricting public feeds and unauthenticated access, - limiting the `KNOWLEDGE_KNUPDATE` capability to trusted users, - restricting direct network access to Elasticsearch.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | OpenCTI | < 7.260807.0 | >= 7.260807.0 | Patch available | GHSA-2j3w-4m6x-38ff |
| — | OpenCTI LTS 7.260309.0 | < 7.260309.0-lts.7 | >= 7.260309.0-lts.7 | Patch available | GHSA-2j3w-4m6x-38ff |
- OpenCTI Vendor— Affected < 7.260807.0 Fixed in >= 7.260807.0 Patch available GHSA-2j3w-4m6x-38ff
- OpenCTI LTS 7.260309.0 Vendor— Affected < 7.260309.0-lts.7 Fixed in >= 7.260309.0-lts.7 Patch available GHSA-2j3w-4m6x-38ff
Remediation
- Fix · GHSA-2j3w-4m6x-38ff OpenCTI Fixed in >= 7.260807.0 Advisory →
- Fix · GHSA-2j3w-4m6x-38ff OpenCTI LTS 7.260309.0 Fixed in >= 7.260309.0-lts.7 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-2j3w-4m6x-38ff
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences