Arbitrary notify-user event injection in Rocket.Chat
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- Security bypass
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- None · Low · Low
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · GHSA-r3v3-v742-55j5. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-345.
Summary
Rocket.Chat is affected in releases before the fixed versions listed in the solution. The stream-notify-room-users stream forwards a caller-supplied event name to the notify-user streams of other room members, which is an incomplete fix for an earlier flaw (CWE-345). An authenticated user who shares a room with a victim can inject arbitrary notify-user events, such as a force_logout event that logs the victim out or a uiInteraction event that displays attacker-controlled UI.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
Description from the GitHub advisory
## Summary `GHSA-27jx-236m-3f5j` (fixed in 8.6.1) restricted `stream-notify-user`'s `allowWrite` so a client can no longer write arbitrary events directly to another user's notify-user stream (it now only accepts `video-conference` / `media-calls`). However, the sibling stream `stream-notify-room-users` still **forwards an arbitrary, caller-supplied event name to other room members' notify-user streams**, which re-opens the exact primitive GHSA-27jx set out to close - now reachable by any authenticated user who shares a room with the victim. By writing `"<sharedRoomId>/force_logout"` to `stream-notify-room-users`, an attacker delivers a `force_logout` event to every other member's notify-user stream, and the client's `useForceLogout` hook wipes local auth - a repeatable, targeted logout (denial of service). The same primitive can inject other high-impact notify-user events such as `uiInteraction` (renders attacker-controlled UIKit modals/banners → UI phishing) and the fake message/notification that GHSA-27jx originally described. ## Root cause `apps/meteor/server/modules/notifications/notifications.module.ts`: ```ts // streamUser - the path GHSA-27jx fixed: only 'video-conference' / 'media-calls' are accepted, else return false. this.streamUser.allowWrite(async function (eventName, data) { const [, e] = eventName.split('/'); if (e === 'video-conference') { /* VideoConf.validateAction(...) */ } if (e === 'media-calls') { /* ... */ return false; } return false; // everything else rejected }); // streamRoomUsers - NOT covered by the fix: the event name `e` is taken from the caller and forwarded verbatim. this.streamRoomUsers.allowWrite(async function (eventName, ...args) { const [roomId, e] = eventName.split('/'); // e is arbitrary at runtime (the type annotation is not a check) if (this.userId && (await Subscriptions.countByRoomIdAndUserId(roomId, this.userId)) > 0) { const subscriptions = await Subscriptions.findByRoomIdAndNotUserId(roomId, this.userId, {...}).toArray(); subscriptions.forEach((subscription) => self.notifyUser(subscription.u._id, e, ...args)); // forward to notify-user } return false; }); // notifyUser emits straight onto the notify-user stream: notifyUser(userId, eventName, ...args) { return this.streamUser.emit(`${userId}/${eventName}`, ...args); } ``` Two things make it exploitable: 1. **`e` is never whitelisted at runtime.** The TypeScript type says `` `${string}/video-conference` | `${string}/userData` ``, but at runtime `e = eventName.split('/')[1]` is whatever the caller sends, and it is forwarded to `notifyUser(otherMember, e, …)` → `streamUser.emit(`${otherMember}/${e}`, …)`. 2. **The forward is a side-effect inside `allowWrite`.** The streamer method handler (`streamer.module.ts:244-254`) runs `isWriteAllowed()` (which invokes the `allowWrite` callback) *before* deciding to broadcast. The callback performs the `forEach notifyUser(...)` and then returns `false`. Returning `false` only suppresses the notify-room-users broadcast - the forward to notify-user has already happened. The client acts on the injected event without validating its origin, e.g. `apps/meteor/client/views/root/hooks/loggedIn/useForceLogout.ts`: ```ts getNotifyUserStream(`${userId}/force_logout`, () => { setForceLogout(true); wipeLocalAuth(); // no payload/sender check - any force_logout event logs the user out }); ```
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | Rocket.Chat | <8.8.0, <8.7.2, <8.6.2, <8.5.3, <8.4.6, <8.3.8, <8.2.8, <8.1.8, <7.10.15 | 8.8.0, 8.7.2, 8.6.2, 8.5.3, 8.4.6, 8.3.8, 8.2.8, 8.1.8, 7.10.15 | Patch available | GHSA-r3v3-v742-55j5 |
- Rocket.Chat Vendor— Affected <8.8.0, <8.7.2, <8.6.2, <8.5.3, <8.4.6, <8.3.8, <8.2.8, <8.1.8, <7.10.15 Fixed in 8.8.0, 8.7.2, 8.6.2, 8.5.3, 8.4.6, 8.3.8, 8.2.8, 8.1.8, 7.10.15 Patch available GHSA-r3v3-v742-55j5
Remediation
Upgrade Rocket.Chat to 8.8.0, 8.7.2, 8.6.2, 8.5.3, 8.4.6, 8.3.8, 8.2.8, 8.1.8 or 7.10.15, using the fixed version of the release branch in use.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
- Fix · GHSA-r3v3-v742-55j5 Rocket.Chat Fixed in 8.8.0, 8.7.2, 8.6.2, 8.5.3, 8.4.6, 8.3.8, 8.2.8, 8.1.8, 7.10.15 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-r3v3-v742-55j5
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences