Pi-hole debug log and tricorder upload expose password hashes and TOTP secret
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Attack complexity
- High
- Impact type
- Information disclosure
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- High · None · None
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · GHSA-qfq3-88xg-765w. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-532.
Summary
Pi-hole's pihole -d debug script writes the contents of /etc/pihole/pihole.toml to its debug log without redaction. The web interface password hash, the app password hash and the TOTP secret are therefore stored in /var/log/pihole/pihole_debug.log and, if the user accepts the upload, sent to tricorder.pi-hole.net. Anyone who obtains the log or its tricorder URL can attack the password hashes offline and generate valid second-factor codes from the TOTP secret. The existing pwhash redaction in parse_file is not applied to this file.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
Description from the GitHub advisory
### Summary `pihole -d` logs the contents of `/etc/pihole/pihole.toml` (it is in `REQUIRED_FILES`) through `make_array_from_file`, which applies no redaction. The only redaction in the script (`pwhash = ` in `parse_file`) is not used for this file. The web interface password hash (`webserver.api.pwhash`), the app password hash (`webserver.api.app_pwhash`) and the TOTP secret (`webserver.api.totp_secret`) are therefore written to `/var/log/pihole/pihole_debug.log` and, if the user accepts the upload, sent to tricorder.pi-hole.net. Found by static review; verified on v6.5 (commit `f503a65`) and unchanged on `development` at `4b33f6e4`. ### Details `advanced/Scripts/piholeDebug.sh`: - `REQUIRED_FILES` includes `${PIHOLE_FTL_CONF_FILE}` (`/etc/pihole/pihole.toml`). - `list_files_in_dir` passes it to `make_array_from_file`, which strips comments and blank lines and writes every remaining line to the log. - `parse_file` replaces the value after `pwhash = `, but it is only used for other files. ### Impact Anyone who obtains the debug log or its tricorder URL (for example from a support thread where a user pasted it) gets: - the password hash, which can be attacked offline; - the app password hash, likewise; - the TOTP secret, which lets them generate valid second-factor codes. Locally this adds little: `pihole.toml` is already readable by the `pihole` user and group. ### Remediation Redact `pwhash`, `app_pwhash` and `totp_secret` values in `make_array_from_file` before they reach the log. Users who have uploaded a debug log in the past should consider changing their password and re-enrolling TOTP.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | pi-hole | <= 6.5 | 6.6 | Patch available | GHSA-qfq3-88xg-765w |
- pi-hole Vendor— Affected <= 6.5 Fixed in 6.6 Patch available GHSA-qfq3-88xg-765w
Remediation
Upgrade to Pi-hole 6.6 or later, which is the fixed version. Users who have uploaded a debug log from an affected version should change their password and re-enroll TOTP.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
- Fix · GHSA-qfq3-88xg-765w pi-hole Fixed in 6.6 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-qfq3-88xg-765w
References
Sources
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