Command execution via CSS omni-completion in Vim
Key facts
- Attack vector
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- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
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- Impact type
- Code execution
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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- Fix status
- Fixed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-78.
Summary
Vim before v9.2.1342 passes the file name after an @import rule to glob() without escaping it. On Unix, backticks in that text are run by the shell, which is an OS command injection flaw (CWE-78). An attacker can run commands as the user when the victim opens a crafted CSS file and uses omni completion on the crafted @import line.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
Description from the GitHub advisory
Command Execution via CSS Omni-Completion in Vim < 9.2.1342 ========================================== Date: 12.11.2026 Severity: Low CVE: *requested, not yet assigned* CWE: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (CWE-78) ## Summary The CSS omni-completion script in `runtime/autoload/csscomplete.vim` passes the file name after an `@import` rule from the buffer to `glob()` without escaping it. On Unix, `glob()` hands a pattern containing backticks to the shell, which allows arbitrary command execution when the user completes an `@import` file name in a crafted CSS file. ## Description When completing after `@import "` or `@import url(`, `csscomplete#CompleteCSS()` takes the text typed so far and calls `glob(filestart . '*')` to find matching files. The text is taken directly from the current line and not escaped. If it contains backticks, `glob()` uses the shell for the expansion and the text between the backticks is executed as a shell command. ## Impact Arbitrary command execution in the context of the user running Vim, when the user uses omni completion (`CTRL-X CTRL-O`) on a crafted `@import` line in a CSS file. Exploitation requires: - a Unix-like system (on Windows `glob()` does not invoke the shell), - filetype plugins enabled, so that 'omnifunc' is set for CSS files, - the victim opening a crafted CSS file and using omni completion with the cursor after the crafted `@import` value. The severity is rated Low because, unlike opening the file alone, the user must explicitly invoke omni completion on a crafted suspicious line. ## Acknowledgements The Vim project would like to thank Github user Magashwarahan for reporting the issue. ## References The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch [v9.2.1342](https://github.com/vim/vim/releases/tag/v9.2.1342). - [Commit](https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/cd50664ab086a37839e3d12754040dbc324dbfa7) - [Github Security Advisory](https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-pp46-p33v-78rf)
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | Vim (vim) | < v9.2.1342 | v9.2.1342 | Patch available | GHSA-pp46-p33v-78rf |
- Vim (vim) Vendor— Affected < v9.2.1342 Fixed in v9.2.1342 Patch available GHSA-pp46-p33v-78rf
Remediation
Upgrade Vim to v9.2.1342, which fixes this issue.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-12
- Fix · GHSA-pp46-p33v-78rf Vim (vim) Fixed in v9.2.1342 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-11-12 Threatist record created from GHSA-pp46-p33v-78rf
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences