Vulnerabilities

An unauthenticated local attacker can connect to the Electron DevTools endpoint exposed by Acer NitroSense software (versions up to and including 5.2.63) on localhost TCP port 9993.

An unauthenticated local attacker can connect to the MQTT broker over its localhost WebSocket endpoint in Acer NitroSense software (versions up to and including 5.2.62).

A vulnerability has been identified in the Acer System Monitoring component included with NitroSense and PredatorSense due to insufficient access controls in a privileged service.

A vulnerability has been identified in the Acer System Monitoring component included with NitroSense and PredatorSense.

A vulnerability has been identified in the Acer System Monitoring component included with NitroSense and PredatorSense.

A vulnerability has been identified in the Acer System Monitoring component included with NitroSense and PredatorSense.

A vulnerability has been identified in the Acer System Monitoring component included with NitroSense and PredatorSense.

A vulnerability has been identified in the Acer Agent Service component included with NitroSense and PredatorSense.

A vulnerability has been identified in the Acer Agent Service component included with NitroSense and PredatorSense.

A vulnerability has been identified in the Acer Agent Service component included with NitroSense and PredatorSense.

A security vulnerability has been identified in Planet9 due to incorrect file permissions assigned to an application executable used by the Planet9 background service.

A security vulnerability has been identified in the Planet9 desktop application where a hardcoded read-only API key permitted unauthorized access to internal repositories.

Fixed AES-128-CBC keys inside the AcerConnect OTA application let attackers forge authorization credentials for arbitrary IMEI numbers.

The registration path /v1/account/register provides no bot mitigation mechanisms, allowing malicious automated systems to flood the database.

The web administration panel binds broadly to the public IPv6 address space on port [::]:8080 without default firewall limits, making internal API endpoints reachable over the WAN.

The /v1/Plan service relies entirely on a shared global API token for full administrative management, allowing arbitrary creation of zero-cost network access plans.

The account validation endpoint /v1/User/validate returns comprehensive user profile data sheets, which can be crawled by iterating predictable identification strings.

Weak validation logic within device dissociation API routines allows a remote entity to forcefully unbind unrelated user endpoints, causing severe denial of service.

Leftover engineering diagnostics and factory-level diagnostic software remain exposed on retail builds, giving malicious apps write privileges to internal NVRAM registers.

The device encrypts data using AES-CBC with static zero-filled Initialization Vectors (IVs), making it susceptible to replay attacks and known-plaintext decryption.

Broadcast events allow malicious software to rewrite the device's default Mobile Device Management (MDM) endpoint address, shifting administrative ownership to an external attacker.

High-risk TrustAllCerts routines disable standard TLS certificate validation.

The system Binder boundary accepts unverified pass-through AT commands, giving local applications the power to read baseband files or disable cellular connectivity.

Incoming VPN network profile settings fail to process special characters safely, enabling command injection via malicious config files.

System log files output unencrypted SMTP server authentication passwords alongside sensitive employee corporate identification data.