ECOVACS Vacuum and Base Station Hard-Coded WPA2-PSK
ECOVACS robot vacuums and base stations communicate via an insecure Wi-Fi network with a deterministic WPA2-PSK, which can be easily derived.
13 records
ECOVACS robot vacuums and base stations communicate via an insecure Wi-Fi network with a deterministic WPA2-PSK, which can be easily derived.
ECOVACS vacuum robot base stations do not validate firmware updates, so malicious over-the-air updates can be sent to base station via insecure connection between robot and base station.
ECOVACS robot vacuums and base stations communicate via an insecure Wi-Fi network with a deterministic AES encryption key, which can be easily derived.
Ecovacs Home Android and iOS Mobile Applications up to version 3.3.0 contained embedded access keys and secrets for Alibaba Object Storage Service (OSS), leading to sensitive data disclosure.
The cloud service used by ECOVACS robot lawnmowers and vacuums allows authenticated attackers to bypass the PIN entry required to access the live video feed.
ECOVACS robot lawnmowers store the anti-theft PIN in cleartext on the device filesystem.
ECOVACS robot lawn mowers and vacuums use a shared, static secret key to encrypt BLE GATT messages.
ECOVACS robot lawnmowers and vacuums use a deterministic root password generated based on model and serial number.
ECOVACS robot lawnmowers and vacuums use a deterministic symmetric key to decrypt firmware updates.
ECOVACS lawnmowers and vacuums do not properly validate TLS certificates.
ECOVACS HOME mobile app plugins for specific robots do not properly validate TLS certificates.
ECOVACS robot lawnmowers and vacuums insecurely store audio files used to indicate that the camera is on.
ECOVACS robot lawnmowers and vacuums are vulnerable to command injection via SetNetPin() over an unauthenticated BLE connection.